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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of World War II, through the mandates of Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, 
Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, the Canadian government has 
found itself in conflict with the US Administration over the question of Arctic sovereignty.  This 
situation is particularly difficult because of the power imbalance between the two countries.  
Thus, how Canada deals with the US is critical. 
 John Kirton identifies five ways in which Canada manages its differences with the US on 
foreign policy issues.  The first is the process of ad hoc adjustment and problem-solving on 
individual issues. A second way is by pursuing solutions that achieve integration and 
cooperation.  The third strategy consists of building defences and taking initiatives to reduce 
Canada’s vulnerability to the US.  The fourth strategy involves the deliberate influencing of the 
US domestic policy process in order to create policy that is more advantageous to Canadians.   
 In the fifth strategy, Canada aligns itself with others in the international community, 
building coalitions that can match the power and strength of the US; but more importantly, it 
establishes a place for Canada to lead the discussion and pursue its own interests.  John Holmes 
believed that Canadian foreign policy was best served by multilateralism, as Canada often found 
it difficult to further its own interests within a bilateral framework.  Kirton takes Holmes’ 
argument one step further by observing that by playing a leadership role in the multilateral arena 
on specific issues, Canada can help find global solutions that advance Canadian interests. 
 This thesis uses Kirton’s analytical framework to examine the strategies that Canada has 
employed in dealing with conflicts with the US over the Arctic.  It examines the Trudeau, 
Mulroney, Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments and finds a common thread in their 
approaches.  While showing that each one adopted a number of the strategies identified by 
Kirton, the thesis draws particular attention to their common utilization of the fifth strategy – of 
working with others to reshape the international or global community’s perspective on Arctic 
issues in the pursuit of Canadian interests. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Canada and the United States (US) have faced-off over Arctic sovereignty numerous 
times since World War II; every decade seems to present a new confrontation or disagreement 
between the two countries that sparks an intense nationalistic reaction from the Canadian public.  
From the end of World War II through the mandates of Prime Ministers Pierre Trudeau, Brian 
Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin and Stephen Harper, the Canadian government has found 
itself in conflict with the US Administration over the question of Arctic sovereignty.  Canada has 
never ceded ground on the principle of Canadian sovereignty, but it has, at times, appeared 
frozen in indecision about how to manage relations with the US on the related issues.  Its strategy 
in dealing with the Arctic has varied, and, as this thesis will show, has taken a number of forms. 
The foundation of the Canada-US relationship in the Arctic was built in the early years of 
the Cold War.  Soviet aggression caused the US to start insulating itself from possible attack.  
The US Administration believed a possible Soviet air invasion would come from the North, 
through Canada’s Arctic, which led it to cooperate with the Canadian government in the 
construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW), Mid-Canada and Pinetree Lines.1  Prime 
Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King allowed the US to access the Arctic but was suspicious 
of its motives; he believed the US’ desire to increase its military presence in the Arctic could 
result in the loss of Canadian sovereignty in the region.2  This possibility led Lester Pearson, 
then a senior official in the Department of External Affairs, to declare in a 1946 Foreign Affairs 
article, written “without authorization” from the government,3 that the ice-covered waters of the 
Arctic archipelago were Canadian property.4
                                                 
1 Douglas C. Nord, “Searching for the North in North American Foreign Policies: Canada and the United States,” 
American Review of Canadian Studies 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 210.  For a thorough review of Canadian-American 
relations in the Arctic post-World War II, see J.L. Granatstein, “A Fit of Absence of Mind: Canada’s National 
Interest in the North to 1968,” in The Arctic in Question, ed. E.J. Dosman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
13-33. 
  When he became Prime Minister, Pearson 
endeavoured to assert Canadian sovereignty in the north by proposing to draw straight baselines.  
2 Adam Lajeunesse, Lock, Stock and Icebergs: Defining Canadian Sovereignty from Mackenzie King to Stephen 
Harper (Calgary: Center for Military and Strategic Studies, 2008), 2-3. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 Lester B. Pearson, “Canada Looks ‘Down North,’” Foreign Affairs 24, no. 4 (July 1946): 638-639. Academic 
Search Complete, EBSCOhost (24 September 2008). 
 2 
The US Administration protested and Pearson withdrew his proposal.5
 In September 1969, the voyage of the US super tanker the USS Manhattan through the 
Northwest Passage caused a public outcry, which demanded that the Canadian government assert 
its sovereignty over the Arctic.
  Despite its failure in the 
early years to gain international recognition of its Arctic claims, the Canadian government 
consistently believed the Arctic archipelago fell under its jurisdiction, but its inability to legally 
establish its sovereignty over the area continued to create problems in the ensuing decades.  
6  What began as a simple exercise in Arctic navigation ballooned 
into a full-fledged diplomatic dispute when the US Administration refused to ask permission for 
its US Coast Guard to accompany the Manhattan.7  Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s response to 
the situation was highly innovative in that he defined the Arctic sovereignty issue in terms of an 
emerging international law of the sea agenda, allowing Canada to take the lead on the issue and 
drive it forward.  In 1970, the Canadian Parliament enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA).8  However, as Adam Lajeunesse has observed, “this functional 
approach left the question of Canadian sovereignty still unaddressed.”9
 The next showdown over Canadian Arctic sovereignty came in 1985, when US State 
Department officials notified the Canadian government that a US vessel, the Polar Sea, would be 
traversing the Northwest Passage during the summer to travel from Greenland to Alaska.  
According to US officials, the voyage was a time-saving and cost-cutting measure; sailing 
through the Panama Canal was far more expensive and a far longer trip.
  
10
                                                 
5 E.J. Dosman, “The Northern Sovereignty Crisis 1968-1970,” in The Arctic in Question, ed. E.J. Dosman (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), 35. 
  As in the case of the 
Manhattan, US failure to ask for Canada’s permission to sail through the Northwest Passage 
resulted in a confrontation between the two countries over Arctic sovereignty.  The Canadian 
government’s initial response was to draw straight baselines around its Arctic archipelago; these 
were declared in September 1985 and came into effect on January 1, 1986.  Two years later, 
Canada negotiated the Arctic Cooperation Agreement (ACA) with the US, which made reference 
to the need for cooperation between the two Arctic neighbours in order to “advance their shared 
6 For an example, see “The Master Sails Everywhere,” The Globe and Mail, 5 September 1969, p. 6. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [13 October 2008]. 
7 Dosman, “The Northern Sovereignty Crisis,” 38-39. 
8 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, in Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, vol. 7, chapter A-12 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1985). 
9 Lajeunesse, Lock, Stock and Icebergs, 8. 
10 Christopher Kirkey, “Smoothing troubled waters: the 1988 Canada-United States Arctic co-operation agreement,” 
International Journal 50, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 403. Academic Search Complete, HeinOnline (10 October 2008). 
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interests in Arctic development and security.”11
 The early 1990s saw some change in Canada-US relations regarding the Arctic.  
Lajeunesse attributes this to the end of the Cold War, which made “defending the region…less 
vital.”
  In this case, the US Administration was willing 
to formally ask the Canadian government for its consent to allow US icebreakers to travel the 
Northwest Passage; the caveat was that the US still claimed that the Northwest Passage was an 
international strait.  Canada and the US agreed to disagree.   
12
 Chrétien and his government saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to build 
stronger relationships with other circumpolar countries, including Russia.  The Northern 
Dimension document clearly stated that circumpolar cooperation was a key foreign policy goal 
for Canada.
  The “desire for a peace dividend” following the Cold War led to new approaches to 
Arctic policy, which were spelled out in Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s Arctic policy, and in 
particular, a government publication entitled The  Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign 
Policy. 
13  The establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 was a significant achievement for 
the Chrétien government and reflected a new approach to Arctic policy, although it was only 
achieved after Canada made significant concessions to appease US concerns.14
The other new approach to Arctic policy during the Chrétien period centred on the 
concept of security.  In its most traditional sense, security is understood in terms of external 
threats and the actions and functions of the state; the state protects its area of jurisdiction from 
foreign intrusion – normally by military means.  However, in the decade following the end of the 
Cold War, the concept of security was expanded and came to focus more on individuals and 
communities and the threats of non-state actors that put them at risk.  This concept was termed 
‘human security.’  The Canadian government, under Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy, 
was a global champion of human security in the late 1990s; the Northern Dimension policy 
document included a pledge “to promote the human security of northerners and the sustainable 
   
                                                 
11 “Agreement between the government of Canada and the government of the United States of America on Arctic 
cooperation,” 11 January 1988. Available online: <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cts.1988.29.en.html> 
(10 October 2008). 
12 Lajeunesse, Lock, Stock and Icebergs, 9. 
13 Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy 
(Ottawa: 2000), 1-2. Available online: <http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/ndcfp-en.pdf> (18 
September 2008). 
14 Douglas C. Nord, “Canada as a Northern Nation: Finding a Role for the Arctic Council,” in Handbook of 
Canadian Foreign Policy, eds. Patrick James, Nelson Michaud, and Marc J. O’Reilly (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2006), 305-307. 
 4 
development of the Arctic.”15
 The Canada-US relationship fundamentally changed after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and the tone of Canada-US relations on the Arctic was affected.  The 
Administration of President George W. Bush became “more concerned about terrorists sneaking 
into North America or rogue states using the oceans to transport weapons of mass destruction” 
than with circumpolar cooperation, and it began to take measures that focused on security of the 
US homeland.
  At the time, Canadians were becoming increasingly aware of the 
effects of global warming and the consequences for the Arctic.  The rapid disappearance of ice in 
the Arctic created new security challenges for the Canadian government, and the concept of 
human security gave the government an innovative way of approaching the Arctic question.  
16  In April of 2002, the Bush Administration announced the establishment of US 
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), created specifically for “homeland defence,” and whose 
“area of operations” would include Canada.17  Chrétien did not seem all that concerned about the 
impact of these developments on Arctic questions; he seemed to believe that Canada’s 
sovereignty was well in hand.18  And Paul Cellucci, the US Ambassador to Canada, downplayed 
the announcement by stating that USNORTHCOM was not meant to either replace or 
complement Canada’s own security forces.19
There were no further confrontations over the Arctic until the 2005-06 Canadian national 
election campaign.  In December 2005, Conservative leader Stephen Harper announced his 
party’s intention to defend Arctic sovereignty by building three new icebreakers, establishing a 
port near Iqaluit, placing sensors underwater to trace the activity of foreign vessels in Arctic 
waters, and increasing air surveillance over the area; the initiatives were expected to cost of $3.5 
billion.
 
20
                                                 
15 Ibid., 2. 
  Following Harper’s election as Prime Minister in January 2006, David Wilkins, US 
Ambassador to Canada, criticized the government’s plan to militarize the Arctic, stating, “We 
have agreed to disagree, and there’s no reason…to say, ‘There’s a problem that’s occurring and 
16 Michael Byers, Intent for a Nation: What is Canada For? (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2007), 158. 
17 Jim Garamone, “US Northern Command to Debut in October,” USNORTHCOM News, 17 April 2002. Available 
online: <http://www.northcom.mil/News/2002/041702.html> (28 June 2009). 
18 Jean Chrétien, quoted in Allan Thompson, “PM undecided on new defence link,” Toronto Star, 18 April 2002, p. 
A6. [Online Database Subscription]: Canadian Newsstand [28 June 2009]. 
19 Shawn McCarthy, “US plays down Northcom threat,” The Globe and Mail, 19 April 2002, p. A14. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Canadian Newsstand [28 June 2009]. 
20 “Tories plan to bolster Arctic defence,” CBC News, 22 December 2005. Available online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/story/canadavotes2006/national/2005/12/22/elxn-harper-dfens.html> (28 June 2009). 
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we gotta do something about it.’”21  Harper retorted by declaring, “It is the Canadian people we 
get our mandate from, not the ambassador from the United States.”22
The Harper government has made a number of public statements committing Canada to 
defending Arctic sovereignty by military means.  Promises of new patrol ships, new helicopters 
and a new deep water port have been reiterated numerous times.
  It was the beginning of a 
new era of tensions between the two countries over the Arctic. 
23  Other plans include building 
a military training center in Resolute Bay, refurbishing the Aurora planes, and buying twelve 
other transport planes.24  Harper has also taken steps to assert Canada’s presence in the north, 
including enacting measures to extend Canada’s territorial sea limit to 200 miles and to require 
all foreign vessels entering Arctic waters to report to Canada’s Coast Guard.25  On the other 
hand, the recently released northern strategy document, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, 
Our Heritage, Our Future, suggests a more cooperative approach to dealing with the US 
Administration on Arctic issues.26
 
   
1.2 Research Question and Objectives 
 Many scholars lament the lack of assertive and definitive Arctic policy measures by the 
Canadian government.  Rob Huebert states that Canada’s handling of its northern territories over 
the years “has been primarily of a reactive and minimalist nature.”27
                                                 
21 David Wilkins, quoted in, “Harper brushes off US criticism of Arctic plan,” CBC News, 26 January 2006.  
Available online: <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/01/26/wilkins-harper060126.html> (28 June 2009). 
  P. Whitney Lackenbauer 
22 Stephen Harper, quoted in, Gloria Galloway, “Harper rebukes US envoy over Arctic dispute,” The Globe and 
Mail, 27 January 2006, p. A4. [Online Database Subscription]: Canadian Newsstand [28 June 2009]. 
23 Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Stephen Harper announces new Arctic offshore patrol ships,” 9 July 
2007. Available online: < http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1741> (10 October 2008). 
24 Andrew Mayeda and Randy Boswell, “Arctic Ambitions: Canada’s stake in the North,” Victoria Times Colonist, 
16 August 2008. Available online: <http://www.canada.com/victoriatimescolonist/news/story.html?id=b8af2779-
b8dd-4918-a8c6-799e78e6c8a9> (10 October 2008). 
25 Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Harper announces measures to strengthen Canada’s Arctic sovereignty 
and protection of the northern environment,” 27 August 2008. Available online: 
<http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2259> (28 June 2009).  The US seemed disappointed with Harper’s 
announcement and expressed its intention to take up the matter with the Canadian government in the following 
article: “US concerned with new Canadian shipping rules in the Arctic,” Canwest News Service, 28 August 2008.  
Available online: <http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=ddf03f21-1628-4659-aeda-
52dfe3635085> (28 June 2009). 
26 Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future 
(Ottawa: July 2009), 34-36. Available online: <http://www.northernstrategy.ca/cns/cns.pdf> (4 August 2009). 
27 Rob Huebert, “The Return of the ‘Vikings’: The Canadian-Danish dispute over Hans Island – New challenges for 
the control of the Canadian North,” in Breaking Ice: Renewable Resource and Ocean Management in the Canadian 
North, eds. Fikret Berkes, Alan Diduck, Helen Fast, Rob Huebert, and Micheline Manseau (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2005), 320. 
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asserts similarly that Canadian Arctic policy in the twentieth century was framed by a 
“reactionary, crisis-based mentality.”28  In particular, “outside forces have typically driven the 
northern foreign policy agenda.”29
 Confrontations and disagreements between Canada and the US over the Arctic are 
historic, going back to old boundary disputes, particularly the Alaska boundary dispute of 1903, 
the US presence in northern Canada in the post-World War II years, and, more recently, the 
Manhattan and Polar Sea incidents.
  The US is one, if not the most important, of those forces.  
30  The Canadian government continues to operate at a 
disadvantage because its legal position on the Northwest Passage is not unassailable.31  While 
this remains the case, it is faced with dealing with the US over disputes regarding the Arctic 
basically on its own.  This situation is particularly difficult because of the “inequality inherent in 
any relationship between two countries so disparate in size and power.”32   Thus, how Canada 
deals with the US is critical.33
 John Kirton identifies five ways in which Canada manages its differences with the US on 
foreign policy issues.  The first is the simple process of “ad hoc adjustment and pragmatic 
problem solving of…individual issues”
     
34 (hereafter referred to as ad hoc adjustment).  A second 
way is by pursuing solutions that achieve “deeper integration” and cooperation between the two 
countries35 (hereafter referred to as deliberate integration).  The third strategy consists of 
“building defences” and taking initiatives “to reduce Canada’s vulnerability to the US”36 
(hereafter referred to as building defences).  The fourth strategy involves the “deliberate” 
influencing of the internal policy processes of US politics in order to create policy that is more 
advantageous to Canadians37
                                                 
28 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “Arctic Front, Arctic Homeland: Re-evaluating Canada’s Past Record and Future 
Prospects in the Circumpolar North,” July 2008: 1-2. Preliminary paper for the Canadian International Council.  
Available online: <http://www.igloo.org/canadianinternational/research/publicatio> (5 September 2008). 
 (hereafter referred to as political penetration).  A fifth strategy is a 
long-term one, and involves Canada seeking, in a broader sense, to:  
29 Ibid. 
30 John Kirton, “Beyond Bilateralism: United States-Canadian Cooperation in the Arctic,” in United States Arctic 
Interests: The 1980s and 1990s, eds. William E. Westermeyer and Kurt M. Shusterich (New York: Springer-Verlag 
New York Inc., 1984), 312. 
31 Dosman, “The Northern Sovereignty Crisis,” 42. 
32 Adam Chapnick, Canada’s Voice: The Public Life of John Holmes (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 150. 
33 John Holmes, Life with Uncle: The Canadian –American Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1981), 44. 
34 John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Toronto: Nelson, 2007), 266. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
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“deliberately and directly produce a full-scale alternative global order to that of America, 
rather than merely constraining America’s effort at the margin, picking niches to pursue 
abroad…It involves formulating a vision of global order, based on Canadian interests and 
values, as ambitious and well defined as that of the United States.  It requires competing 
against America globally to have America adjust to the Canadian conception of which 
ideas and institutions should prevail”38
While this fifth global order strategy appears essentially to be multilateralism, it is not; it 
goes beyond multilateralism.  The strategy is informed by Kirton’s principal power theory, 
where Canada plays a leadership role in multilateral and plurilateral organizations in pursuit of 
policies that reflect “unique Canada-based interests.”
 (hereafter referred to as global order).  
39  The strategy is more than bilateralism, 
but different than “[United Nations (UN)]-based multilateralism.”40  Its goal is “modification of 
the global order through leadership in defining and legitimizing a new approach.”41
 Of these five problem-solving approaches or strategies, four place Canada at a 
disadvantage right from the start; that is, the US has the upper hand due to its relative power.  
This is particularly true in the case of the first strategy of ad hoc adjustment, and also in the 
second strategy of deliberate integration, where the goal is deeper integration and cooperation 
with the US.  In both cases, Canada finds itself trying to placate US concerns rather than 
asserting itself or pursuing its own interests.  Although the third strategy of building defences to 
reduce Canada’s vulnerability does seek to protect Canadian interests, Canada is no match for 
the US in economic or military terms; any success in such endeavours is not a long-term 
solution.  Political penetration of US policy processes, the fourth strategy, is difficult at best and 
impossible at worst due to the sheer size and complexity of the US domestic policy process 
system: infiltrating it requires making one’s voice heard above the fray of US lobbyists, which is 
no easy task; to do so often requires concessions, even before the matter at hand is put on the 
table.   
 
 The fifth strategy of global order is the one that is highlighted by this thesis.  Instead of 
attempting to protect its interests through bilateral discussions with the US on particular issues, 
Canada works to reshape the international community’s approach to such issues, achieving 
greater success in furthering its interests.  John Holmes believed that “Canadian foreign relations 
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 David B. DeWitt and John Kirton, Canada as a Principal Power: A Study in Foreign Policy and International 
Relations (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons Canada Limited, 1983), 115. 
40 Kirton, “Beyond Bilateralism,” 296. 
41 DeWitt and Kirton, 71. 
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were best served by multilateral accords, and [that] bilateral dealings with a more powerful 
neighbour were anything but uneven.”  Without multilateral support, Holmes believed “it would 
not be possible for Canada to make a beneficial arrangement” for Canadians on most issues.42
This thesis uses Kirton’s analytical framework to examine the approach that Canada has 
taken in dealing with conflicts with the US over the Arctic.  It examines the Trudeau, Mulroney, 
Chrétien, Martin and Harper governments and identifies a common approach utilized by all in 
dealing with such conflicts – the fifth strategy of global order, identified by Kirton – a strategy 
of working with others to situate Arctic issues within the larger context of an evolving 
international or global order, where Canadian interests can be furthered. 
  
Kirton takes Holmes’ argument one step further by observing that Canada works with others, 
often within the context of multilateral organizations, to create an alternative kind of global order 
or system that clearly brings benefits. 
 
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
 This thesis will employ a case study analysis.  It will examine four specific Arctic policy 
initiatives from four different decades in order to demonstrate how Canada manages 
disagreements with the US.  The first case study investigates the events surrounding the 
enactment of the AWPPA by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1970.  The second covers the 
Polar Sea incident and the resulting policies pursued by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney through 
to the end of the 1980s.  Third is an examination of the Arctic policies of the government of Jean 
Chrétien and later, of Paul Martin, from the establishment of the Arctic Council through 
September 11, 2001 and beyond.  The fourth analyzes the Arctic policies of the government of 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper.  Analysis of these specific cases will reveal a number of 
different approaches that various Canadian governments have taken to manage disputes with the 
US over Arctic sovereignty, including the primary one of acting like a principal power. 
Government documents, newspaper articles and secondary sources will be the main 
sources cited in this study.  Government documents include: policy papers produced by the 
Department of Northern and Indian Affairs (INAC), the Department of Defence and Canadian 
Forces (DND/CF) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT); press 
releases; background papers; fact sheets; party platforms; House of Commons debates; and 
                                                 
42 Chapnick, 270. 
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speeches.  The memoirs of prime ministers will be used as first-hand accounts where appropriate.  
The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star provide excellent accounts of the disputes between 
Canada and the US over the Arctic, and are important sources for quotations from the political 
figures involved. 
Secondary sources used will come from a variety of academics.  John Kirton and John 
Holmes will largely provide the theoretical perspectives on Canada-US relations, with other 
academics cited where appropriate.  Current Arctic policy is analyzed by Rob Huebert, P. 
Whitney Lackenbauer and Franklyn Griffiths, as well as by Ken Coates, Lackenbauer, William 
R. Morrison and Greg Poelzer in Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North.  For 
information on earlier iterations of Arctic policy, the thesis will cite the work of J.L. Granatstein, 
as well as E.J. Dosman’s book, The Arctic in Question (1976).  Numerous journal articles will 
also be referenced, including published papers by Douglas C. Nord, Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, 
Christopher Kirkey, D.M. McRae and Rob Huebert. 
 
1.4 Organizational Structure 
 The thesis is divided into six chapters.  Following the introduction, each of the next four 
chapters focuses on a specific case.  Chapter 2 looks at Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the 
AWPPA.  Chapter 3 examines Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’s policy responses to the voyage 
of the Polar Sea, and his government’s launching of the idea of an Arctic Council.  Chapter 4 
studies Arctic policy during Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s time in office, as well as the policies 
of his successor, Prime Minister Paul Martin.  Finally, Chapter 5 analyzes the wide-ranging 
Arctic policies of Prime Minister Stephen Harper.  
  The sixth chapter will provide a conclusion based on the findings from the case studies.  
The thesis will examine the different strategies or approaches used by Canada to help it manage 
disagreements with the US over the Arctic, and show how it has consistently taken a leadership 
role in Arctic issues and used multilateral means to do so.   
 
1.5 Importance of the Thesis 
 For Canadians, the issue of Arctic sovereignty is always portrayed as a question of 
nationalism and identity.  Time and time again the issue is oversimplified and the US is painted 
as the enemy.  In reality, Canada’s inability (and maybe unwillingness) to enforce its sovereignty 
 10 
over the Arctic has made the issue a bilateral one.  As the Arctic ice continues to melt at a rapid 
pace, there will be further confrontations between Canada and the US; how we deal with these 
disputes will determine our Arctic’s future.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
TRUDEAU AND THE AWPPA 
 
2.1 Background 
 In October 1968, Humble Oil, a US company, announced its intentions to send an oil 
tanker, the USS Manhattan, through the Northwest Passage.  The voyage was an experiment; it 
was meant to test both the cost-effectiveness and feasibility of shipping oil from the newly-
discovered Alaskan oil fields of Prudhoe Bay to the continental US.  Its first journey, heading 
north from the east coast of the US and then moving west through the Northwest Passage, began 
on August 25, 1969; a month and a half later, on September 14, it reached the waters off northern 
Alaska.  From April to May of 1970, the ship completed a second voyage through the Northwest 
Passage.43
 Initially there was little concern in Ottawa about the Manhattan’s planned voyage.  In 
fact, Humble Oil informed the Canadian government of its plans and asked for assistance, which 
Ottawa saw as an “acknowledgement of [Canadian] sovereignty of the Passage.”
 
44
 While asserting, maintaining and defending Canada’s presence in the Arctic was the main 
goal of the Trudeau government in dealing with the Manhattan voyages, both the public and the 
government also became more aware of the environmental threats posed by possible future use 
of the Northwest Passage as an international shipping channel.
  The 
Canadian government agreed to assist by providing reports of ice conditions and an icebreaker 
escort.  There was concern when the US announced that it would send one of its Coast Guard 
vessels to accompany the Manhattan – without asking the Canadian government for permission 
to do so. 
45
                                                 
43 John Kirton and Don Munton, “The Manhattan Voyages and Their Aftermath,” in Politics of the Northwest 
Passage, ed. Franklyn Griffiths (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 70-71. 
  The government’s strategy was 
to assert Canada’s presence in the Arctic by defining the issue as an international matter of 
protecting the vulnerable Arctic environment.  In April 1970, the Trudeau government 
introduced the AWPPA, which demarcated a twelve-mile territorial sea and created a 100-mile 
Pollution Prevention Zone, both of which extended from the coasts of all territories within the 
44 Ibid., 71; Elizabeth B. Elliot-Meisel, “Still unresolved after fifty years: the Northwest Passage in Canadian-
American relations, 1946-1998,” The American Review of Canadian Studies 29, no. 3 (October 1999): 412-413.  
45 Maxwell Cohen, “The Arctic and the National Interest,” International Journal 26, no. 1 (1970-71): 65. 
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Arctic archipelago and effectively placed all of the inner waters of the Northwest Passage under 
Canadian control. 
 
2.2 Canadian Response to the Manhattan Voyage 
For the Canadian government, the initial policy thrust originated from the belief that the 
Manhattan incident “presented Canada with both threats and opportunities.”46  The government 
feared that if Humble Oil’s experiment proved that the Northwest Passage was indeed a viable 
shipping route, other companies would begin to use it on a regular basis; this would not only 
work to solidify US claims that the Passage is an international strait, but also expose the 
relatively untouched Arctic environment to a multitude of hazards such as air pollution and oil 
spills.47
At this time, international law over coastal waters was just beginning to take shape.  The 
1951 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Fisheries Case (United Kingdom 
v. Norway) had created the legal precedent as to what jurisdiction states have over what waters.
  However, the threat of environmental damage provided the Trudeau government with 
an opportunity to prompt the international community to move the over-arching law of the sea 
agenda in a direction that would effectively support Canada’s position on the Arctic. 
48  
The ICJ ruled that historic title to coastal waters did exist and that states whose coastlines 
consisted of islands and inlets could draw straight baselines from island to island, enclosing the 
inlets and defining them as internal waters, over which the state has full authority.  The case was 
a reminder that there was little international agreement on the limits of territorial seas and coastal 
claims.  It had also generated momentum for the codification of international law on the issue, 
resulting in the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.  This conference saw the 
ratification of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in 1958, which 
essentially adopted the ideas of straight baselines and historical title from the Fisheries Case and 
entrenched them as the foundational concepts of the emerging modern international law of the 
sea.49
                                                 
46 Kirton and Munton, 71. 
 
47 Ibid. 
48 International Court of Justice, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway), 1951. Available online: 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/5/1809.pdf> (13 June 2010). 
49 D.M. McRae, “The Negotiation of Article 234,” in Politics of the Northwest Passage, ed. Franklyn Griffiths 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 99. 
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Armed with these new concepts, subsequent Canadian governments began to toy with the 
idea of drawing straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago and claiming the Arctic waters 
as internal waters.  The government of Louis St. Laurent discussed the idea, but never made an 
“official statement” on it.50  The same “policy of purposeful ambiguity” was followed by John 
Diefenbaker.51  In 1963, the Canadian government decided to draw straight baselines around the 
entire Arctic archipelago, but the US Administration protested and Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson reversed the decision.52
The failure of previous governments to make definitive pronouncements on where 
Canada stood regarding the Arctic put the Trudeau government in a difficult position.  The US 
would surely denounce any further attempts to draw straight baselines in the Arctic, as it 
remained firm in its position that the Northwest Passage constituted an international strait; 
Washington believed that if it allowed Canada to claim the Passage as internal waters, a 
precedent would be set that would limit US freedom of navigation throughout the world.
  
53  Yet 
Ottawa still naively believed that the US would “eventually” acquiesce “without the 
inconvenience of [Canada] having to actively assert a claim.”54
Still, there was a certain amount of fear amongst Canadian officials.  They knew that US 
President Richard Nixon “would not accept any unilateral extension of Canada’s maritime 
boundaries.”
 
55  There was also concern that a straightforward declaration of sovereignty would 
result in economic retaliation from the US, specifically an embargo on Canadian oil exports.56  
Canadian officials had little doubt that the US would challenge any such declaration.57  They 
also knew that their case, largely based on historic title, was “not airtight.”58  If Canada lost a 
legal challenge at the ICJ, there would be major ramifications, not only for the status of Canadian 
sovereignty in the Arctic - but for Canada-US relations.59
                                                 
50 Lajeunesse, Lock, Stock and Icebergs, 5. 
  Bilateral talks during the last half of 
1969 showed that the US had the same concerns: “the message was clear – Washington would 
51 Ibid., 3. 
52 Dosman, “The Northern Sovereignty Crisis,” 35. 
53 Suzanne Lalonde, “Arctic Waters: Cooperation or Conflict?” Behind the Headlines 65, no. 4 (August 2008): 9. 
54 Lajeunesse, Lock, Stock and Icebergs, 7. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Dosman, 41. 
57 John Saywell, Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs 1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1971), 350. 
58 Dosman, 42. 
59 Kirton and Munton, 78. 
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resist Canada’s sovereignty claims but was as anxious as Ottawa to avoid, or at least delay, a 
confrontation.”60
Initial public reaction to the voyages of the Manhattan was negligible; but throughout 
1969 and into early 1970, Canadian nationalism was stoked by increased media coverage and the 
protests by the opposition Progressive Conservative (PC) and New Democratic (NDP) parties.
  But public pressure was mounting on the Canadian government to do 
something, and with the added pressure came an opportunity for political gain. 
61  
In September of 1969, The Globe and Mail cautioned Canadians to put aside feelings of 
“ultranationalism” while the government dealt with the sovereignty crisis in the Arctic.62  Yet in 
February 1970, the Globe admonished the government for its inaction and refusal to confront the 
US: “The Government has kept shying off…like a scared virgin who knows that she shouldn’t 
surrender but figures she may have less trouble if she does.”63
 The perceived threat to Arctic sovereignty tapped into that “near-mystical bond” 
Canadians have with their Arctic.
 
64  It also exploited Canadians’ long-held suspicions of US 
motives at a time when “heavy-handed United States responses” were the norm, as opposed to 
the more cordial and cooperative relations of years past.65  Canadians felt “that they were on the 
edge of another American ‘steal’ of Canadian resources and ‘rights’ which had to be dealt with at 
once by firm governmental action.”66  The situation worsened in February 1970 when US 
President Richard Nixon spoke of the need to “head off the threat of escalating national claims 
over the ocean” in a foreign policy speech to the US Congress; a State Department spokesperson 
later confirmed that Nixon’s statement applied to the Northwest Passage, as well as to other 
disputed areas.67  The following day, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp made the Trudeau 
government’s “strongest claim yet” of Canada’s control over the Northwest Passage.68
                                                 
60 Ibid., 76. 
  Sharp 
stated: 
61 Kirton and Munton, 74. 
62 “Guard on the jewel case,” The Globe and Mail, 13 September 1969, p. 6. [Online Database Subscription]: 
Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [16 May 2009]. 
63 “In the Arctic the wrong man is meek,” The Globe and Mail, 18 February 1970, p. 6. [Online Database 
Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [16 May 2009]. 
64 Elliot-Meisel, 407. 
65 Cohen, 72. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Terrance Wills, “Nixon wants agreement on territorial boundaries,” The Globe and Mail, 19 February 1970, p. 4. 
[Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
68 Donald Newman, “Sharp makes claim to Arctic waters,” The Globe and Mail, 20 February 1970, p. 1. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
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“These are our waters.  There has never been any question of that.  We have always 
regarded them as our waters.  The question may be whether other people regard them as 
our waters – but that is another matter.”69
Although Sharp’s statement further escalated the conflict between Canada and the US, the 
Canadian media and the public were pleased with the declaration.
   
70
 The opposition parties were more than happy to capitalize on intensifying public 
pressure.  Throughout 1969 and early 1970, the PCs and the NDP continually pressed the 
Trudeau government to declare full sovereignty of the Northwest Passage and the other internal 
waters of the Arctic archipelago.
 
71  In January 1970, the two opposition parties worked together 
to try and force Parliament to vote on a motion put forward by Member of Parliament Paul 
Yewchuk (PC), which called for “an immediate assertion of sovereignty over the water between 
the northern Canadian islands…which dot the Northwest Passage.”72  The motion was inspired 
by the tabling of a report by the Standing Committee on Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development which called for the same action.73  The government opposed the motion and 
expressed concern that if it was forced to vote no, there could be “serious international 
repercussions for Canada,”74 effectively “making explicit its doubts as to the strength of the 
Canadian sovereignty claim in international law.”75  The government was able to sidestep the 
motion, but the calls for immediate and decisive action did not subside as NDP Leader Tommy 
Douglas accused the government of “diplomatic pussyfooting.”76  The debate over the motion 
sparked another round of media and public outrage over the government’s “resolute timidity” in 
settling the matter.77
                                                 
69 Mitchell Sharp, quoted in, ibid. 
  
70 “Batten the hatches!” The Globe and Mail, 21 February 1970, p. 6. [Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s 
Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
71 See John Dafoe, “Trudeau restates claim to Arctic islands,” The Globe and Mail, 16 May 1969, p. 3. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]; Lyndon Watkins, 
“Canada must insist on control in Arctic: MP,” The Globe and Mail, 8 September 1969, p. 1. [Online Database 
Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
72 Donald Newman, “Soft-pedal on Arctic sovereignty challenged by Tory,” The Globe and Mail, 20 January 1970, 
p. 2. [Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
73 Ibid. 
74 “Showdown looms as Speaker rules on debate on Arctic sovereignty,” The Globe and Mail, 21 January 1970, p. 8. 
[Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
75 “Sharp refuses vote on asserting rights in Arctic,” The Globe and Mail, 23 January 1970, p. 1. [Online Database 
Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [16 May 2009]. 
76 Ibid. 
77 “More than a land mass,” The Globe and Mail, 26 January 1970, p. 6. [Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s 
Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
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 After months of political and diplomatic posturing, as well as immense public pressure, 
the government finally unveiled the AWPPA on April 8, 1970, as well as another bill that set a 
twelve-mile territorial sea limit extending from the coastline of all islands in the Arctic 
archipelago.  This second bill effectively closed off both entrances into the Northwest Passage, 
placing them under full Canadian control.  The AWPPA set a 100-mile boundary extending 
outward from the coastline of the outer Arctic islands, creating a zone within which the Canadian 
government claimed to control all commercial shipping for the purposes of protecting the fragile 
Arctic ecosystem.   
Prime Minister Trudeau stated this was “not an assertion of sovereignty.”78  In the House 
of Commons, External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp indeed described the AWPPA as a 
“constructive and functional approach,”79 chosen because Trudeau believed that “sovereignty for 
sovereignty’s sake was a hollow and self-defeating concept.”80  That same day, the government 
announced that it would “no longer respect the authority of the [ICJ]” over matters of pollution 
in the Arctic Ocean.81  But it stressed that it chose to reserve judgement on the AWPPA not 
because it felt it was acting “in breach of international law, rather, in the special Arctic 
circumstances, we were acting on behalf of the international community in the absence of 
applicable law.”82
Public and media reaction to the AWPPA was extremely positive; the Trudeau 
government had capitalized on the rampant nationalism that the Manhattan voyages had stirred 
among Canadians.  The Globe and Mail called the measure “bold and necessary,”
  The next step would be to bring the rest of the world onside.   
83 and the 
Toronto Star “was ecstatic,”84
                                                 
78 John Burns, “Canada to set 12-mile limit, 100-mile Arctic control zone,” The Globe and Mail, 9 April 1970, p. 1. 
[Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
 proclaiming the bill “a diplomatic feat of the sort to which 
Canadians have not been treated for as long as memory serves, executed with finesse and daring 
79 Mitchell Sharp, quoted in, CB Bourne, ed. Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1971 (Vancouver, UBC 
Press, 1971), 284. 
80 Ivan L. Head and Pierre Elliott Trudeau, The Canadian Way (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc.: 1995), 34. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 39. 
83 “Bold and necessary,” The Globe and Mail, 10 April 1970, p. 6. [Online Database Subscription]: Canada’s 
Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [18 May 2009]. 
84 Saywell, 352.   
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– if at the 11th hour.”85  Canadians were delighted by their government’s “creativity and 
cleverness.”86
 There were a few detractors.  Opposition leader Robert Stanfield criticized the 
government for not making a definitive statement on sovereignty, while the NDP lamented the 
government’s decision not to recognize the authority of the ICJ in this matter.
 
87  But the 
opposition’s cries were derided and mocked; The Globe and Mail deemed the opposition’s 
disapproval “unreasonable.”88  The Winnipeg Free Press published a negative editorial following 
the announcement of the AWPPA, stating that the bill would “acquire substance only if it is 
generally recognized or enforceable.  In the latter regard we are a nation of limited means.”89  
But the public did not seem to care that there was no definitive statement on Arctic sovereignty, 
nor care how the AWPPA was to be enforced; in fact, “the domestic demand for a 
straightforward declaration of sovereignty died almost instantly.”90
 
 
2.3 US Response to the AWPPA 
As media and public attention waned in Canada, the interest of the US Administration in 
the actions of the Trudeau government increased.  Washington’s condemnation of the AWPPA 
was swift and fierce; the State Department delivered a diplomatic note of protest a few days after 
the announcement.  The note argued that “international law provides no basis for these proposed 
unilateral extensions of jurisdictions on the high seas, and the USA can neither accept nor 
acquiesce in the assertion of such jurisdiction.”91  For the US, Canadian assertion of jurisdiction 
in the Arctic was “an issue of precedent and principle, not one of national security;”92
 The US reaction to the AWPPA was not unexpected.  Throughout 1969 and early 1970, 
Washington had sent a number of diplomatic notes to the Canadian government regarding its 
 if the US 
recognized Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, other countries would seek to 
assert control over their own straits.   
                                                 
85 James Eayrs, “Fighting off the buccaneers in the Arctic,” Toronto Star, 14 April 1970, p. 6. [Online Database 
Subscription]: Toronto Star – Pages of the Past [20 May 2009]. 
86 Kirton and Munton, 93. 
87 Stan McDowell, “Stanfield attacks PM’s move to guard Arctic,” Toronto Star, 9 April 1970, p. 10. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Toronto Star – Pages of the Past [20 May 2009]. 
88 “Bold and necessary,” ibid. 
89 Quoted in Saywell, 352. 
90 Kirton and Munton, 93. 
91 Bourne, ed., Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 1971, 288. 
92 Elliot-Meisel, 419. 
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position on the Arctic; it argued that if Canada made any attempt to assert control over the 
region, the US would be forced to denounce the move in order to protect its naval interests 
worldwide.93  However, not everyone in the US reacted negatively.  Mike Gravel, a US Senator 
from Alaska, said that the US “should be the first to recognize intelligent innovation on the 
Canadian side.”94  The Washington Post stated that Canada was simply “moving in to occupy a 
vacuum in the hope that disastrous oil spills may be avoided instead of merely being fought over 
after possibly permanent damage has been done.”95  The US knew that “Canada would win the 
battle for world public opinion,” so it decided to take a more measured approach.96
 While Canadian diplomats began to criss-cross the globe in search of international 
support for their innovative piece of legislation, the US sent out invitations to a proposed 
international conference that would seek to create an “international regime for Arctic areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.”
 
97  There was veiled concern amongst Canadian officials as to the 
“real extent of the US agenda;” accordingly, Canada began a series of “informal consultations” 
in hopes of building consensus and heading off any attempts by the US to control the agenda.98  
Canada was highly successful, gaining support from all circumpolar countries, including the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).  It won the public relations battle, reducing the 
power and influence of the US in shaping international maritime law.99
In the ensuing years, Canada worked tirelessly towards negotiating a UN resolution that 
would protect the fragile Arctic environment and validate the AWPPA in the eyes of 
international law.  Five years later, Article 234, titled “Ice-Covered Areas” was adopted.
  By the end of 1970, the 
UN Secretary General called for a Law of the Sea Conference to take place in New York in 
1973.   
100  The 
Article states that “Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws 
and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone.”101
                                                 
93 Head and Trudeau, 32, 35, 42, 43. 
  But while negotiating 
94 Ibid., 58.   
95 Ibid. 
96 Kirton and Munton, 94. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Head and Trudeau, 58 
99 Kirton and Munton, 95. 
100 Article 234 was included in the 1982 UNCLOS agreement. 
101 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part XII: Protection and Preservation of the Marine 
Environment, Article 234, “Ice-covered areas,” 10 December 1982. Available online: <http://www.un.org/ 
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Article 234 was considered “a major policy success,” the fact that the US did not sign (and still 
has not signed) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) made it 
difficult for Canadian officials to declare complete victory.  The US position on Article 234 was 
viewed as “ambiguous,” making it difficult to gauge whether or not the US recognized the 
AWPPA as legitimate.102
 
 
2.4 Dealing with the US 
 According to John Holmes, the AWPPA “asserted the right of a lesser power not only to 
challenge but also to push along international law when the great powers [are] intransigent.”103  
This approach reflects the global order strategy – to take the lead and define the Arctic issue 
within a larger perspective that calls for an “alternative global order.”104  In this case, pursuing 
diplomacy in a new area of environmentalism produced an alternative to directly opposing or 
appeasing the US.  Andrew Cooper terms this type of diplomatic activity as ‘constructive 
internationalism,’ whereby Canada focuses its energy on collaborating and consulting with other 
powers to create coalitions which work through international institutions towards building 
international norms and rules.  The underlying motive of constructive internationalism is that the 
establishment of international norms and rules is a means to an end; it creates the best possible 
environment in which Canada can pursue its national interests and offset the power of the US.105
 John Holmes aptly observes that Canadians “find security in the Americans’ power and 
insecurity in considering what wild things they might do with it.”
  
106  In this case, insecurity 
certainly existed amongst Canadian policy makers, who feared how the US Administration might 
respond to any direct pronouncements of Canadian control over the Arctic.  As the weaker 
partner in the Canada-US relationship, Canada has sometimes sought “to appeal to the stronger 
power’s ultimate sense of fairness.”107
                                                                                                                                                             
depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part12.htm> (21 May 2009). 
  In this case, it sought to give the idea of environmental 
protection enough global currency that the US, feeling the weight of international pressure, 
would at least temper its response to Canada’s actions.  
102 McRae, 112-113. 
103 John Holmes, “Most Safely in the Middle,” International Journal 39, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 376. 
104 Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World, 266. 
105 Andrew Cooper, Canadian Foreign Policy: Old Habits and New Directions (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall 
Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1997), 36-37. 
106 Holmes, Life with Uncle, 107. 
107 Ibid., 44. 
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 Trudeau sidestepped the question of sovereignty and instead focused on the state’s right 
to “defend its environmental integrity.”108  The lack of international consensus on environmental 
and law of the sea issues allowed the Canadian government to take the lead and act so as to help 
move international law forward on these questions.  This was one way, an innovative way, of 
working to counterbalance US power in the international system, as well as allow Canada to 
pursue its own interests.  Holmes lauded Trudeau’s approach because it “avoided direct 
confrontation and produced a new idea…It was a compromise but one which gave us what we 
needed without unnecessary defiance.”109
 
  The approach both appeased the Canadian public’s 
desire for action and took the issue out of US hands and placed it in the international arena. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Public pressure and intense Canadian nationalism were the main forces driving the policy 
agenda following the announcement of the Manhattan voyages.  The Trudeau government found 
an innovative, albeit uncertain, means of asserting Canada’s presence in the Arctic.  It did so 
because of two factors: concerns about damaging Canada’s relationship with the US, and the 
lack of an international maritime law regime.  It chose not to attempt to assert full control over 
the Arctic archipelago, as this could create serious tensions between Canada and the US.  It also 
might force a hearing before the ICJ, which, even if Canada was not bound to accept its ruling, 
might have harmed Canada’s chances of getting the desired international judgment in the future.  
The Trudeau government was not going to take such a chance, but instead pursued an approach 
that emphasized the need for an agreed upon international maritime law regime.   
Despite all of the attention given by the national press to the conflict between Canada and 
the US over the AWPPA, in the years that followed, the issue of Arctic sovereignty fell to the 
bottom of the list of government policy priorities in Canada.  However, it reappeared at the top 
of that list in 1985 when a US Coast Guard icebreaker, the Polar Sea, traversed the Northwest 
Passage without Canadian permission.   
 
 
 
                                                 
108 McRae, 101. 
109 Holmes, Life with Uncle, 70. 
 21 
CHAPTER 3: 
MULRONEY AND THE POLAR SEA INCIDENT 
 
3.1 Background 
 In late June 1985, the PC government, under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, announced 
that the US Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea would travel through the Northwest Passage in 
August.110  The US Administration characterized the voyage as a simple time-saving measure, as 
it needed the Polar Sea to both resupply the US airforce base in Thule, Greenland, and complete 
its patrol of the Western Arctic.  The Northwind, an older US icebreaker, normally undertook the 
supply mission to Greenland, but mechanical problems kept it at home.  The US Coast Guard 
decided to send the Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage rather than the Panama Canal as a 
means of ensuring that both the resupply and patrol missions would be carried out in a timely 
manner.111
 The US Coast Guard informed the Canadian government of its plans in late May 1985.  
Well aware of the public furor that had erupted over the voyage of the Manhattan, Washington 
took great care in emphasizing the “practical nature” of the expedition.
   
112  And as a sign of its 
willingness to cooperate, US officials invited Canada to participate in research aboard the 
icebreaker during the trek.113  The US believed that because the Polar Sea’s voyage was “of an 
operational nature,” and the ship was a government ship and not a commercial one, the voyage 
would be seen as “less threatening.”114  Canada seemed to agree, stating in a diplomatic note to 
the US, dated June 11, 1985 that although it considered the waters of the Arctic archipelago to be 
Canadian waters, it was willing to cooperate and “would welcome an early opportunity to 
consult with the United States on all matters related to the voyage.”115
                                                 
110 Jeff Sallot, “Arctic voyage raises problems in diplomacy,” The Globe and Mail, 21 June 1985, p. 8. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [28 May 2009]. 
  The Canadian 
government did not ask the US to seek permission for the Polar Sea expedition.  US officials 
111 Rob Huebert, “Polar vision or tunnel vision: The making of Canadian Arctic waters policy,” Marine Policy 19, 
no. 4 (July 1995): 344.  
112 Rob Huebert, “A Northern Foreign Policy: The Politics of Ad Hocery,” in Diplomatic Departures: The 
Conservative Era in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-93, eds. Nelson Michaud and Kim Richard Nossal (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2001), 85. 
113 Huebert, “Polar vision or tunnel vision,” 345. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canadian Embassy, Washington, DC, Note no. 331, 11 June 1985, 
quoted in J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), 344-345. 
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thought that the voyage was approved and that they could go ahead without need for any further 
diplomatic exchange.116
However, the position taken by the Canadian government changed.  The Polar Sea was to 
begin its journey on August 1; on July 31, Ottawa delivered another diplomatic note to the US.  
While expressing disappointment at the unwillingness of the US to recognize Canadian 
sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, the note gave Canada’s consent for the Polar Sea’s 
voyage – despite the fact that the US had not sought it.
   
117
The Mulroney government followed up on September 10, 1985, when External Affairs 
Minister Joe Clark announced six measures designed to assert Canadian sovereignty in the north.  
The Canadian government intended to: draw straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, 
withdraw the 1970 ICJ reservation on the AWPPA, increase aircraft and naval patrols in the 
north, construct a new icebreaker, enact the Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act, and open 
negotiations with the US over the status of the Northwest Passage.
  The media took note and set in motion 
an outpouring of nationalist sentiment from Canadians, much as the Manhattan voyage had done 
fifteen years earlier. 
118
 
  These measures eventually 
resulted in the signing of the ACA with the US in January 1988, as well as a series of decisions 
by the Mulroney government to order a number of military aircraft and naval vessels to patrol the 
Arctic and enforce Canadian sovereignty. 
3.2 Initial Canadian Response 
 Public response to the Polar Sea voyage was strong, swift, and mostly negative, just as it 
had been when the Manhattan traversed the Northwest Passage.  One positive response to the 
Polar Sea’s expedition came from the mayor of Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories (NWT), 
who expressed hope that the media coverage would force the government to create a policy for 
the north and lead to the economic development of his community.119
                                                 
116 Huebert, “Polar vision or tunnel vision,” 346. 
  However, most 
northerners, particularly the Inuit, were vocal in expressing their fears that the voyage could have 
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“far-reaching implications for effective environmental control in the Arctic.”120  Inuit Tapirisat 
of Canada released a statement in which the organization vowed to protect its interests by 
lobbying the international community if the Canadian government could not and did not assert 
sovereignty.121  The Inuit were mainly disappointed at the government’s unwillingness to 
“protect the rights of the people [in the north] and of its citizens” whose economic livelihood was 
threatened if the Northwest Passage became vulnerable to environmental threats posed by 
shipping.122
 A number of interest groups also condemned the Polar Sea’s voyage and the Canadian 
government’s lack of action on the Arctic.  The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee 
characterized the government’s response as “weak and indecisive,” as an attempt to appease 
Canadians through “symbolic gestures,” such as placing a couple of Canadians onboard the 
Polar Sea to ensure that the AWPPA was not violated.
  
123  The Council of Canadians waged a 
protest against the voyage, calling for the Canadian government to remove its “token, powerless 
observers” from the ship and charge the US with violating Canadian sovereignty.124  The group, 
in tandem with a number of Inuit interest groups, raised money to rent a plane which dropped a 
canister on to the deck of the Polar Sea.  The canister included a couple of Canadian flags as 
well as a number of messages for the US government.  One message asked the Polar Sea and its 
crew to “go back where they came from.”125
 In Parliament, the opposition parties took advantage of the public furor and chastised the 
government for its failure to act.  In late July, External Affairs critic Jean Chrétien denounced the 
Mulroney government.  Stating that Mulroney was “very soft on the Americans,” Chrétien 
accused the Prime Minister of “cronyism” and implied that his friendly personal relations with 
senior US officials were causing him to forget to protect Canadian interests.
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Chrétien accused Mulroney of putting Canadian sovereignty at risk.127  That same day, both the 
Liberals and the NDP called on the Mulroney government to refer the dispute over the Northwest 
Passage to the ICJ.128  A week later, Opposition leader John Turner stated that Mulroney was 
“not doing his job” and termed his inaction as “unacceptable.”129  Later that same month, Turner 
called the Polar Sea’s voyage “an affront to Canadians.”130
 The government also felt pressure from the academic community.  It was, in fact, a 
professor from the University of Toronto who first informed the Canadian public of the Polar 
Sea’s upcoming voyage.
  
131  Professor Franklyn Griffiths was adamant that the government make 
its presence felt in the north: “We’ve got to get up there.  We’ve got to put up or shut up about 
our Arctic sovereignty…to put it simply, use it or lose it.”132  Other critics of government policy 
included Professor Donat Pharand, a leading expert on UNCLOS and jurisdictional issues in the 
Canadian north, who pressed the government to spend the money necessary to procure an 
icebreaker and other surveillance equipment: “Surely the price of sovereignty can never be too 
high.”133  He also stated that the government should draw straight baselines around the Arctic 
archipelago:  “Canada should take the bull by the horns, draw the lines on the map and say to the 
world that those waters are internal waters of Canada."134  Robert Macdonald, an expert in 
international law, agreed with both Pharand and Griffiths in stating that the government needed 
to “adopt a policy that will lead to a stronger presence in the Arctic.”135
 Across the country, newspapers joined the public in urging the Mulroney government to 
take action.  Concurring with both Arctic and legal experts, much of the written press 
recommended that the government refer the Northwest Passage dispute to the ICJ and build an 
  All three experts pushed 
the Mulroney government to not be afraid to take the Arctic sovereignty issue to the ICJ. 
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icebreaker to both patrol and protect the north.136  The Globe and Mail also criticized the US’ 
role in the dispute, describing its behaviour as “contempt for a feckless friend.”137  The Toronto 
Star agreed with The Globe and Mail’s characterization of the US, stating that “even friends 
need invitations.”138  Many also warned that if the government did not take steps to resolve the 
dispute, sovereignty in the north might be lost: “If Canada doesn’t exercise its sovereignty in the 
north, some other country might.”139  The Globe and Mail argued that “in the long term, it could 
prove both more costly and more risky to abdicate control of Arctic waters than to exercise it.”140  
It also claimed that the public outcry over the Polar Sea’s voyage was not simply “an expression 
of petty nationalism,” but a genuine outpouring of concern over “Canada’s economic, 
environmental and strategic interests.”141  A former captain with the Canadian navy said that 
Canadians were “overreacting” to the Polar Sea’s trek.142
 The six policy initiatives announced by External Affairs Minister Joe Clark on September 
10, 1985, were designed to both assert and enhance Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.  In the 
introduction of his statement to the House of Commons, Clark remarked that: 
  But his opinion was in the minority, 
and the Mulroney government was forced into action. 
“The voyage of the Polar Sea demonstrated that Canada, in the past, had not developed 
the means to ensure our sovereignty over time.  During that voyage, Canada’s legal 
position was fully protected, but when we looked for ways to exercise our sovereignty we 
found that the Canadian cupboard was nearly bare.”143
Two of the six initiatives were introduced to specifically address the lack of surveillance, as well 
as surveillance equipment, in the Arctic: the government planned to increase both air and naval 
patrols and to build a Polar 8 icebreaker.  Related to these initiatives was the introduction of 
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legislation to enact the Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act, which would enhance the legal 
powers of the government to regulate offshore activities in the Arctic Ocean. 
 Clark’s other three initiatives had international ramifications.  First, the Canadian 
government would be withdrawing its reservation of the AWPPA from the ICJ.  This signalled 
the government’s confidence that international maritime law had evolved to the point where the 
AWPPA would be upheld if challenged.  Second, the government would draw straight baselines 
around the entire Arctic archipelago, declaring all of the waters between the islands to be internal 
Canadian waters.  The third initiative would be an opening of negotiations with the US 
Administration to establish a regime of cooperation between Canada and the US on the Arctic, 
albeit with the proviso that the US show and acknowledge “full respect for Canada’s 
sovereignty.”144  He insisted that the Polar Sea’s voyage “left no trace on Canada’s Arctic waters 
and no mark on Canada’s Arctic sovereignty.”145
 
  It was evident that the Canadian public had 
pressured the government into taking action. 
3.3 The Arctic Cooperation Agreement (ACA) 
The US response to these initiatives was mixed.  While it “welcomed” the opportunity to 
negotiate the status of the Northwest Passage,146 Washington expressed “regret” that Canada 
declared straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago and stated that it “had no intention of 
backing away from…claims to unrestricted sailing rights in the far north.”147  Negotiations with 
the US began in the fall of 1985, soon after Clark’s announcement.148
 Canada entered into the negotiations with the goal of attaining US recognition of 
Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic.
 
149  Its secondary goal, if the first one became unattainable, 
was to “gain some ‘control’ over transits made by US vessels [through the Northwest Passage], 
both government and commercial.  In exchange, Canada would provide assurances for the 
passage of US vessels – assurances that would meet their security and commercial concerns.”150
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However, Canada could not be seen as “acquiescing to the Americans.”151  The Mulroney 
government had “political motivations to defuse an issue that if left unresolved could have 
potentially detrimental electoral consequences in the immediate future (that is, in the next federal 
election).”152
 The first phase of negotiations ran from late 1985 into spring of 1986 and involved 
lower-level government bureaucrats from both sides.  During these months, Canada demanded 
that the US recognize full Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage in exchange for 
guaranteeing passage for all US ships and submarines.  The US refused to accept Canadian 
sovereignty over the region and stuck to its claim that the Northwest Passage remained an 
international strait.  This period of the bargaining process focused on trying to “address the 
problem from a legal standpoint,”
 
153 and negotiations ended in a stalemate.154
 Negotiations resumed soon after Prime Minister Mulroney visited US President Ronald 
Reagan at the White House in March 1986.  Mulroney raised the issue of Arctic sovereignty with 
Reagan in private meetings, hinting that if the US did not relent at least somewhat on its hard-
line position, the Northwest Passage might become open to international traffic.  In his memoirs, 
Mulroney recalls that he tried to get Reagan to realize that an open Northwest Passage would 
compromise US security interests by allowing the USSR easy access to North America.  Reagan 
replied, “We won’t challenge your sovereignty…We should work toward an arrangement.”
  
155  
The following day the President reiterated his position: “Let the sovereignty issue lie where it 
is…Anything we do [in Canadian Arctic waters] will be with your permission.”156
 Canadian External Affairs Minister Joe Clark and US Secretary of State George Schultz 
appointed special envoys to oversee the resumption of negotiations.  Mulroney’s Chief of Staff, 
Derek Burney, represented Canada, and Ed Derwinski, Under-Secretary of State, represented the 
US Administration.  There seemed to be an urgency on the US side to come to an agreement as 
soon as possible; Derwinski said that he received a phone call from the President with orders to 
“get this [agreement] nailed down.”
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been reached, although speculation emerged that one was imminent.158  Clark’s Chief of Staff, 
Jodi White, called the reports “premature” and stated that the US had “still not recognized 
Canadian sovereignty in the North and it is those difficulties and differences which we are trying 
to work out through these talks.”159
 It took yet another intervention from Reagan again to spur the negotiations to their 
conclusion.  The President visited Mulroney in Ottawa in April 1987, who stressed the political 
consequences for his government if an agreement was not reached soon.  When Reagan 
reaffirmed his government’s position that the Northwest Passage was an international strait, 
Mulroney said, “If this is your position, and there is a direct bloody challenge to our sovereignty, 
I’ll be obliged to take all kinds of action to ensure that my government is not blown out of the 
water.  This is a grave, grave matter.”
  It appeared that both sides had reached another impasse. 
160  The following day, in a meeting between Reagan, 
Mulroney and Clark, Mulroney pointed out the location of the Northwest Passage on a globe to 
Reagan and stated, “Ron, that’s ours.  We own it lock, stock, and icebergs.”161  Reagan replied 
that the Northwest Passage did seem to be a part of Canada’s internal waters and said, “That’s 
not the same as the map they showed me on Air Force One…All the islands are Canadian.”162  
Clark then added that the Inuit live on the islands of the Arctic archipelago and use the winter ice 
as a means of transportation; “that is what makes it different,” Clark stated.163  The encounter 
seemed to make Reagan sympathetic to the Canadian claim, and he told his officials to reach 
some sort of compromise.164
 The result was the ACA, signed on January 11, 1988.  Both parties essentially agreed to 
disagree on the status of the Northwest Passage, but cooperate in order to serve both the security 
and the political interests of each nation.  As Derek Burney put it, “Eventually, we settled on  a 
solution that reflected more or less what neighbours would do…I don’t mind you cutting across 
my lawn to go to the corner store, provided you ask first.”
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At first glance, the ACA appeared to be a victory for the Canadian government, as the 
third article stated that “The Government of the United States pledges that all navigation by US 
icebreakers within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent 
of the Government of Canada.”166  But the agreement was more notable for what it did not 
include than what it did.  There was no US recognition of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic: 
“Nothing in this agreement of cooperative endeavour between Arctic neighbours and friends nor 
any practice thereunder affects the respective positions of the Governments of the United States 
and of Canada.”167  Moreover, the ACA only covered passage for US icebreakers; passage for 
submarines was not addressed.  The Toronto Star’s Gordon Barthos wrote that “all the new deal 
means is there’ll be no more unexpected and politically damaging US jaunts through the 
Arctic.”168  The agreement had basically “ignored the question of sovereignty.”169
 Still, before the public, both the Canadian and US governments viewed the ACA as 
“mutually satisfactory.”
 
170  Mulroney stated the agreement was “an important step forward for 
Canada...that is fully consistent with the requirement of Canadian sovereignty in the 
Arctic…What we have now significantly advances Canadian interests.”171  Reagan remarked that 
the ACA represented “a pragmatic solution based on our special bilateral relationship, our 
common interest in cooperating on Arctic matters, and the nature of the area.  It is without 
prejudice to our respective legal positions.”172  Canada’s Ambassador to the US, Allan Gotlieb, 
asserted that “the Mulroney government did extract an important concession from the US…as 
sovereignty is only a bundle of rights, the most important of which is control over the territory 
concerned, and as Canada did gain additional control…Canada’s sovereignty was enhanced.”173
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recognition.”174  Although many derided the agreement for its failure to gain US recognition of 
Canadian sovereignty, the ACA seemed to somewhat appease the Canadian public.  That some 
progress had been made was suggested when in 1988, the US Administration formally requested 
permission for one of its icebreakers, the Polar Star, to sail through the Northwest Passage.175
 
 
3.4 The 1987 White Paper 
 In June 1987, the Mulroney government unveiled a plan to modernize Canada’s defence 
forces.  Entitled Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada (the White Paper), 
the document stated that “the primary means with which Canadian security policy is 
implemented, the Canadian Forces, have been sadly neglected…Decades of neglect must be 
overcome.”176  The White Paper was, in large part, a response to the Polar Sea voyage177 and it 
renewed Canada’s commitment to being a “three-ocean” nation.178
“In addition to deterrence and defence, the new thrust of exploration of the seabed and 
competition for resources that may be found in the Arctic could lead to disputes about 
sovereignty over maritime supremacy and rights of passage.  While these are unlikely to 
be settled by gunboat diplomacy, Canada would be in a much stronger position to press 
her claims if she possessed adequate capabilities to establish surveillance and presence in 
the contested waters.”
  Defence Minister Perrin 
Beatty was well aware of the inability of the Canadian Forces to properly patrol and survey the 
Arctic, and he understood that the Arctic was quickly becoming an issue that necessitated action: 
179
Canadians could not afford to ignore that “what was once a buffer could become a 
battleground.”
 
180
 The White Paper unveiled the government’s plans to enhance surveillance and protection 
of the Canadian Arctic by procuring six new long-range patrol aircraft and continuing to invest 
in the development of Canadian underwater sonar systems.
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Mulroney government was now planning to buy 10-12 nuclear submarines.182  In an op-ed to The 
Globe and Mail, Beatty elaborated that the submarines were safe and desperately needed in order 
to guard all of Canada’s waters, particularly those covered by ice: “We cannot abandon our 
Arctic waters to the submarines of other nations, in peacetime or times of war.”183
 But the announcement of the planned purchase of 10-12 nuclear submarines sparked a 
fierce debate about Canada’s commitment to nuclear disarmament.  Although the government 
went to great lengths to ensure that all Canadians knew that the submarines would not be armed 
with nuclear weapons,
  
184 and vehemently denied any intentions to engage in hostilities with 
ships crossing into Canadian waters,185 the public expressed deep concern about the use of 
nuclear submarines.  A number of anti-nuclear interest groups, including The Canadian Centre 
for Arms Control and Disarmament and Greenpeace, strongly denounced plans to purchase the 
submarines and accused the government of misrepresenting the sovereignty crisis in the Arctic in 
an effort to strengthen Canada’s military.186  Both the Liberals and the NDP expressed the fear 
that if the government acquired nuclear submarines, it would “send the wrong signal to the 
Russians.”187  The opposition parties expressed concern that if the US was drawn into battle with 
the Russians in the Arctic, Canada would have no choice but to join.188  The US and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also opposed the Canadian plan, concerned that Canada 
was “confusing sovereignty with security” and would cut its commitments to continental security 
and NATO.189
 But the White Paper was largely supported by the public; in fact, 50% of the Canadian 
public agreed with the government’s plan to acquire nuclear submarines.
  
190
                                                 
182 Ibid., 52-55.   
  The Toronto Star 
applauded the government “for beginning a vigorous debate on Canada’s role as a non-nuclear 
country in the nuclear age” and called the White Paper a “thoughtful but cautious document” that 
183 Perrin Beatty, “Why Canada needs nuclear subs,” The Globe and Mail, 6 June 1987, p. D1. [Online Subscription 
Database]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [28 May 2009]. 
184 Challenge and Commitment, 55. 
185 Jeff Sallot, “Subs viewed as ‘ultimate force,’” The Globe and Mail, 6 June 1987, p. 1. [Online Subscription 
Database]: Canada’s Heritage from 1844 - The Globe and Mail [28 May 2009]. 
186 Carol Goar, “A 180-degree turn in our defence policy,” Toronto Star, 6 June 1987, p. B1, B5. [Online 
Subscription Database]: Toronto Star – Pages from the Past [28 May 2009]. 
187 Arch MacKenzie, “Submarine plan sends Russians ‘wrong signals’ opposition says,” Toronto Star, 6 June 1987, 
p. A10. [Online Subscription Database]: Toronto Star – Pages from the Past [28 May 2009]. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Charles F. Doran, “Canadian Relations with the United States,” Current History 87, no. 527 (March 1988): 131. 
190 “50% back subs: poll,” The Ottawa Citizen, 22 June 1987, p. A4. [Online Subscription Database]: Canadian 
Newsstand [28 May 2009]. 
 32 
remained true to Canadian values and interests.191  Vice-Admiral James Wood, Canada’s top 
navy official, stated that the submarines would allow the Navy to actually do its job.192
 The following year, Beatty released Defence Update: 1988-89, which was presented to 
the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence.  This report reiterated 
Canada’s commitment to having “A Three-Ocean Navy”
 
193 and procuring 10-12 nuclear 
submarines.194  It also included a number of new commitments, including: establishing new 
Canadian Ranger patrols in three Inuit communities and continuing to increase funding and 
equipment for all Rangers; building a new Northern Region Headquarters facility in 
Yellowknife; constructing forward operating locations for air defence fighter planes in five 
northern communities; and establishing a northern training centre in Nanisivik.195  These new 
commitments, combined with the government’s previous plans to procure six new long-range 
aircraft, develop an underwater sonar system, and construct a Polar 8 icebreaker, demonstrated 
the Mulroney government’s belief that “sovereignty and security [were] intimately 
connected.”196
 Within a year of the release of the Defence Update: 1988-89, the Cold War was coming 
to an end and the Mulroney government faced a ballooning deficit; these shifts in both the 
international and Canadian domestic environment caused the government to pass on the capital 
commitments outlined in Clark’s policy statement of September 10, 1985 and in the 1987 White 
Paper.
  However, it remained to be seen whether or not the government would follow 
through on its commitments. 
197  When Finance Minister Michael Wilson tabled the government’s budget on April 26, 
1989, he announced that the government was scrapping its plans to purchase both nuclear 
submarines198 and six new long-range aircraft.199
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disapproved of the government’s plans, and in 1989, that number had grown to 71%.200  Defence 
Minister William McKnight (who took over the defence portfolio from Perrin Beatty in January 
1989) stated that the cuts “mean Arctic defence will be left to allies.”201
 Because of the government’s cost-cutting measures, the plans for construction of the 
Polar 8 icebreaker were also in jeopardy.  The project had been plagued by a number of setbacks 
as the military continually redesigned the vessel in response to rising costs.
  
202  External Affairs 
Minister Joe Clark stated that the Polar 8 was no longer “the most cost-effective way of 
achieving the certainty of our sovereignty in the North.”203  The US “quietly welcome[d]” the 
cancellation of the project, viewing it, along with the nuclear submarine promise, “a 
misallocation…of already meagre resources.”204
 
 
3.5 Dealing with the US 
 The approach initially taken by the Mulroney government in its September 1985 policy 
announcement mostly reflected the strategy of building defences to reduce Canada’s 
vulnerability to the US.  The drawing of straight baselines was designed as a deliberate means of 
providing a defence against the US.  Promises of more air and naval surveillance, along with 
plans to construct a new icebreaker, were likewise intended to boost Canada’s scant military 
resources in the Arctic and defend against unwanted intrusion by US and other foreign vessels.  
These initiatives had the effect of both pacifying an angry Canadian public by convincing it that 
the government was taking significant action, and portraying the government as standing strong 
against the US.   
 The Mulroney government also utilized the strategy of ad hoc adjustment when the Prime 
Minister conducted one-on-one discussions with Reagan on the status of the Northwest Passage.  
Mulroney may have felt that he could extract some sort of special concession from the US 
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because of his closeness to the US President.  In the end, Mulroney and Reagan did work out a 
compromise, although, as is often the case, Canada seemed to compromise more than the US did.  
Some would argue that the outcome of these discussions, and of the negotiations that produced 
the ACA, can be viewed as evidence of the utilization of the strategy of deliberate integration.  
Undoubtedly, in these cases, Mulroney’s intent was to assuage the US Administration and allay 
its concerns.   
 The 1987 White Paper again reflects the strategy of building defences.  The document 
clearly constituted a reaffirmation of policy initiatives announced by Clark in September 1985, 
but added was a promise to acquire 10-12 nuclear submarines.  The submarine announcement 
was possibly the strongest proclamation the Mulroney government could make in trying to 
demonstrate its determination to defend its sovereignty in the north.  The announcement sent 
shockwaves throughout NATO and the US; neither was sure what to make of Canada’s sudden 
interest in building itself up militarily.  Once again, the Mulroney government was seeking to 
solidify its domestic political base.  The submarine announcement played well with nationalistic 
Canadians who wanted their military to have the ability to properly guard the waters of the 
Arctic archipelago from foreign intruders.   
 
3.6 The Arctic Council 
 There were two instances when the Mulroney government operated according to a 
perspective that recognized the possibility of multilateral institutions and processes operating so 
as to further Canada’s interests in the Arctic.  One was Clark’s announcement on September 10, 
1985 that the Canadian government was withdrawing its 1970 ICJ reservation instituted at the 
time of the enactment of the AWPPA.  This initiative demonstrated growing confidence within 
the Mulroney government that international law supported Canada’s position on Arctic issues. 
 A second and perhaps more striking instance was the Mulroney government’s early 
promotion in 1989 of the idea of an Arctic Council, consisting of representatives of all of the 
circumpolar countries and having the capacity to resolve differences between the member states 
regarding jurisdictional questions in that region of the globe. 
By the late 1980s, the Cold War had effectively frozen international relations between the 
USSR and the seven other circumpolar countries (Canada, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Denmark/Greenland and the US), as “security concerns prevented the development of any 
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meaningful international cooperation.”205  The Canadian Arctic effectively functioned as a buffer 
of “strategic significance” between the USSR and the US, the front line of an epic confrontation 
between two superpowers.206
All of that changed in 1987.  In a speech in the northern Soviet city of Murmansk, USSR 
President Mikhail Gorbachev called for the Arctic to become “a zone of peace.”
 
207
Mulroney helped advance the evolving agenda of peaceful cooperation in 1989 when he 
proposed the creation of an Arctic Council “to coordinate and promote cooperation” between the 
circumpolar nations.
  With those 
few words, relations between the circumpolar countries began to thaw and genuine peaceful 
cooperation between them became a possibility.   
208  In November 1990, Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, 
announced the Canadian government’s intention to put forward a formal proposal for the 
Council.  The Council was to be an international organization set up “to deal with common 
interests in the Arctic, including the preservation of a fragile environment, transborder pollution, 
the cultural conflicts between indigenous Arctic populations and modern societies, developments 
in transportation and other cold-weather technologies.”209
In 1991, the independent, non-governmental Arctic Council Panel tabled a paper entitled, 
“To Establish an International Arctic Council – A Framework Report” in Northern Perspectives, 
a periodical published by the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.
 
210  In the same issue, 
Professor Donat Pharand set out a draft treaty for the Arctic Council.211  Unfortunately, the 
initial discussions of such a Council were not productive, mostly because of US resistance and 
Washington’s insistence that security issues not be included in the Council’s mandate.212
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idea clearly had public support in Canada, which would help drive it forward in the years that 
followed as a distinctive Canadian initiative.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 For a large part of its time in office, the Mulroney government found itself vacillating 
between utilizing the strategies of ad hoc adjustment and deliberate integration, on the one hand, 
and an assertive defence of Canadian sovereignty by building defences, on the other.  Arguably, 
Mulroney did make some headway through incremental, bilateral dealings with the US: the ACA 
could be interpreted as implicitly acknowledging that Canada had a de facto presence in the 
Arctic.  His government was also arguably successful in convincing Canadians that, whatever the 
US Administration might say about US rights of navigation in the Arctic, the territory remained, 
in effect, under Canadian control. 
 But near the end the Mulroney government showed signs of moving away from its 
inclination to treat Arctic issues as lying solely within the purview of its ongoing relationship 
with the US Administration.  Its promulgation of the idea of an Arctic Council showed that it 
could see the advantages of the global order strategy, where the influence of other actors could 
be brought to bear.  Yet by this time public interest in Canada in the Arctic question had again 
faded.  The changing economic and political climate in Canada in the late 1980s, as the nation’s 
finances fell further into a deficit position, directed the public’s attention to other things. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CHRÉTIEN, MARTIN AND THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
 
4.1 The Chrétien Years 
 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney resigned from office in June 1993.  In the October 
national election that same year, Jean Chrétien and the Liberal Party won a large majority 
government.  Chrétien had a specific Arctic agenda, and his first priority was reviving the idea of 
an Arctic Council.  
The Chrétien years can be divided into three distinct periods, with each period producing 
separate policies on the Arctic.  The first period stretches from Chrétien’s election in 1993 until 
the formation of the Arctic Council in 1996.  The second period runs from 1996 to the unveiling 
of the 2000 Arctic foreign policy document, entitled The Northern Dimension of Canada’s 
Foreign Policy, and into 2001.  And the final period begins with the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and ends with Chrétien’s resignation in December 2003.   
 
4.2 The Arctic Council 
 The Chrétien government’s Arctic policy began to take shape during the 1993 election 
campaign.  The infamous Liberal “Red Book” and its complementary document, the Foreign 
Policy Handbook, contained small but important sections on the Arctic.  Placing the Arctic 
question within a larger social and global framework, the Liberals proposed an Arctic policy that 
promised to “bring together all Arctic states and peoples into a cooperative arrangement 
designed to scale back militarization of the Arctic region, preserve the fragile ecosystem and 
protect the interests of indigenous peoples.”213
 The “Red Book” outlined three specific policy objectives.  First, the Liberals proposed 
the creation of an Arctic strategy, an “Arctic Region Action Plan,” that included measures for 
public engagement, particularly by the Aboriginal community.  Second, the government would 
create a position of Arctic Ambassador (later renamed Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs) 
whose role would be to “facilitate activity in the multilateral arena.”  Third, the Liberals 
  In 1993, the end of the Cold War was seen as an 
opportunity to reconfigure the circumpolar world; it presented the possibility of cooperation and 
demilitarization.    
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promised to “give serious consideration” to building more icebreakers for the Canadian Navy in 
order to more easily assert sovereignty over the Arctic.214
 Following the election of the Liberals, a Northern Foreign Policy Conference was 
convened in April of 1994.  While addressing the conference, Foreign Affairs Minister André 
Ouellet restated his government’s commitment to the idea of an Arctic Council, and its hope that 
this body would be established by the end of the year.
 
215  He also expressed a need for the 
government to “develop both our bilateral and our multilateral relations” across the circumpolar 
north.216
 Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration unveiled its own Arctic strategy. In February 
1994, a confidential Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) was issued to US government 
officials.  While citing the necessity of continued security and control in Arctic, as well as a need 
to maintain freedom of the seas, the PDD also called for the US to play a leadership role in 
promoting cooperation between Arctic countries.  The PDD stated that while security was still an 
important part of an Arctic strategy, the end of the Cold War allowed for “a significant shift of 
emphasis in US Arctic policy.”
  A few months later, the Chrétien government took its first steps towards developing 
circumpolar relationships by appointing Mary Simon as the first Ambassador for Circumpolar 
Affairs.  The Canadian government had turned its full attention towards the creation of the Arctic 
Council.    
217  In September 1994, the US released its new Arctic policy 
document, which advocated “strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic 
nations” and promoted the principles of sustainable development, environmental protection and 
conservation.218
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which Arctic nations can oversee implementation of Arctic strategy.”219  This policy statement 
would prove to be a “crucial turning point” for the US.220
 Throughout 1994 and early 1995, negotiations on the Arctic Council continued between 
Canada and the US.  There were a number of stumbling blocks.  The first was the agenda of the 
Council.  Canada wanted the Council to have an open agenda, where matters ranging from 
environmental protection to security could be discussed, while the US wanted the Council to 
have a narrow agenda, focusing exclusively on environmental protection. The second point of 
contention was the structure of the Council.  The US preferred that the Council be a “flexible 
forum” rather than “a major multilateral organization” that required resources for staffing. 
Canada, on the other hand, wanted the Council to have its own permanent “autonomous” staff 
and funding.  The third stumbling block was the place of Aboriginal peoples within the Council.  
The US viewed the Council as an “intergovernmental association” only.  While the US would 
welcome the voices of Aboriginal peoples, it refused to allow them “equality of status” with the 
member states.
 
221
Despite these differences, negotiations proceeded and Canada continued to push for the 
creation of a Council.  In its 1995 foreign policy statement entitled Canada and the World, the 
Chrétien government stated that Canada had a "particular role in defending and developing the 
Arctic environment, an area where international cooperation is vital and is just beginning.”
 
222  To 
this end it was committed to establishing an Arctic Council “to meet the challenge of sustainable 
development in the North and to deal with the critical issues faced by all Arctic countries.”223
When the negotiations stalled, Canadian officials asked that the issue of the Council be 
placed on the agenda of the Ottawa Summit, which was to take place in February 1995 between 
Chrétien and President Clinton.
   
224  That meeting brought success, with the US delegation 
announcing at the summit’s conclusion that the US was prepared to enter into “formal” 
negotiations to establish the Arctic Council.225
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idea of a Council remained largely negative.  According to Douglas C. Nord, US delegates had 
supported the idea only “in an effort to eliminate a nagging irritant from the bilateral 
relationship.  Most of the US delegates attending the Ottawa meeting did not consider the Arctic 
Council worthy of further prolonged debate and discussion.”226
Disdain for the Council within the US Administration coloured the negotiations that 
followed.  A short time after the February summit, Canada released a draft charter.
 
227  The US 
response was no surprise; the same sticking points resurfaced.  It wanted the Council established 
by declaration rather than by charter to ensure that the organization remained informal.  The US 
also refused to allow for the establishment of a permanent Secretariat, which would ensure that 
the Council would not require large sums of money for administration and program costs.228  
Throughout 1995 and 1996, further negotiations “proved to be spectacularly unsuccessful.”229
In early 1996, the US submitted a counterproposal to the Canadian draft charter.
   
230  The 
proposal put forward a watered-down version of the Canadian draft that was more US-friendly, 
basically eliminating all of the points to which the US objected.  The US then effectively 
announced that it would negotiate no further, and that its final offer was its only offer.  The 
Canadian government acquiesced and accepted almost all of the US demands.  In the end, the 
Arctic Council Declaration signed on September 19, 1996 “bore the clear imprint of Washington 
in nearly all its critical areas...In many respects, the new Arctic Council looked more like an 
American product than that of a Canadian initiative.”231
  
   
4.3 Human Security and The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy 
 Viewing the establishment of the Arctic Council as a springboard, the House of 
Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade launched an 
examination of Canadian foreign policy as it applied to the Arctic.232
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policy; and to outline “specifics [for] strengthening relationships with other Arctic rim 
227 Canada and the Circumpolar World, 38. 
228 Scrivener, 24. 
229 Nord, “Canada as a Northern Nation: Finding a Role for the Arctic Council,” 305. 
230 Canada and the Circumpolar World, 38. 
231 Nord, “Canada as a Northern Nation: Finding a Role for the Arctic Council,” 305-6. 
232 Canada and the Circumpolar World, xi. 
 41 
countries.”233
In all, the report put forward 49 recommendations.  These included: creation of a 
Division for Circumpolar Affairs within DFAIT (recommendation #3); strengthening the role of 
the Ambassador of Circumpolar Affairs (13); consultation with Aboriginal peoples in all matters 
pertaining to Arctic policy (4, 8, 31, 32); reaffirming Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic (14); 
demilitarization of the Arctic (15-17); strengthening environmental agreements, legislation and 
cooperation (18-24); building a framework for sustainable economic development (25-30); 
strengthening relations with circumpolar neighbours (41-49); providing more funding for 
scientific research relating to the Arctic (35-40); and scheduling regular meetings with the US to 
discuss Arctic issues of mutual interest (43).
  The examination resulted in the tabling of a lengthy and comprehensive report in 
1997, entitled Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into 
the Twenty-First Century.   
234
In 1998, the Chrétien government issued a lengthy response to the report which was 
mostly positive; most of the recommendations were welcomed and/or were similar to the 
government’s own plans.
   
235  For example, the government agreed that high-level meetings with 
US officials regarding Arctic issues would be beneficial for both parties.236  The only 
recommendation that the government opposed was recommendation #15, which called for the 
demilitarization of the Arctic.  Demilitarization was viewed as “an abandonment of the Canadian 
military presence in the North,” which would severely impact “present-day communication, 
navigation and transportation networks” throughout the Arctic region.237
Following the release of Canada and the Circumpolar World by the Standing Committee, 
the government issued its own consultation paper in September 1998, entitled Toward a 
Northern Foreign Policy for Canada.  Authored by DFAIT, the paper touched on most of the 
issues and recommendations made by the Standing Committee.  The document set out seven 
major policy themes: sustainable development; environmental protection; social and cultural 
  
                                                 
233 Ibid., 7. 
234 Ibid., 271-286. 
235 Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Government Response to Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Report – ‘Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of 
Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century’ (Ottawa: 1998), under “Introduction – Overview of Government 
Response.”  Available online: <http://www.international.gc.ca/polar-polaire/assets/pdfs/response-en.pdf> (28 June 
2009). 
236 Ibid., under “Theme VII/Multilateral and Bilateral Relations – Recommendation 43/Canada-US Relations.” 
237 Ibid., under “Theme V/Northern Sovereignty and Security – Recommendation 15/Demilitarization in the Arctic.’ 
 42 
renewal; regional good governance and democratic development; northern sovereignty and 
security; bilateral relations with northern neighbours; and consultative processes and national 
unity.238  A small paragraph on Canada-US relations reflected an important shift in Canadian 
policy by citing the new concept of ‘human security.’  The argument was made that US policy 
was moving “away from traditional security issues” and was placing a new focus on Arctic 
concerns.239
It is not surprising that the concept of human security became embedded in the Chrétien 
government’s Arctic policies.  From the establishment of the Arctic Council up to the unveiling 
of the Northern Dimension policy, Lloyd Axworthy was the Minister of DFAIT.  Throughout his 
time as the Minister, Axworthy made human security the “central pillar in his department’s 
policy”
   
240 and sought to make Canada a world leader on human security issues.241
In contrast to traditional or state security, where the principal actor and central security 
concern is the state, human security places the security of individuals at its center. Human 
security argues that traditional or state security is too state-centric and too narrowly defined: 
“forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily 
lives.”
  His 
dedication to this concept led to a number of unique foreign policy initiatives, including the 1997 
landmines treaty and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).  He also 
helped establish the International Council on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, 
although he was no longer Minister of Foreign Affairs when the commission’s final report, “The 
Responsibility to Protect,” was released in December 2001.  Near the end of his tenure, DFAIT 
published an official government statement on human security entitled, Human Security: Safety 
for People in a Changing World (1999). 
242
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subject and actor in international relations,” whose security is “the ultimate goal, to which all 
instruments and peripheral actors are subordinated.”243
Furthermore, in terms of Arctic policy, human security expands the notion of what a 
threat is, arguing that poverty, famine and environmental degradation are security threats.  What 
is unique about these types of threats is that they are posed by non-state actors.  Traditional or 
state security contends that states themselves are the main source of global insecurity since they 
continually seek to maximize their power in order to protect themselves.  Human security 
introduces the notion that some of the most serious threats to security do not come from the state 
level.  For example, it argue that environmental degradation is creating new security challenges, 
particularly in the north where warmer temperatures are making the Arctic more accessible.  
   
The concept of human security was prominent when, in June 2000, the Chrétien 
government released its Arctic policy document, The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign 
Policy.  Of the four policy objectives, the fourth was “to promote the human security of 
northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic.” 244   The other three policy objectives 
were as follows: “to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians;” “to assert and ensure the 
preservation of Canada’s sovereignty;” and “to establish the Circumpolar region as a vibrant 
geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based international system.”245  These objectives were 
to be pursued through four initiatives: (1) establishing a University of the Arctic; (2) 
strengthening relations with Russia; (3) creating sustainable economic development policies 
while increasing trade amongst circumpolar countries; and (4) “strengthening and promoting a 
central place in circumpolar relations and policy coordination for the Arctic Council.”246
 There was little discussion in the document of Canada-US Arctic initiatives.  The intent 
was clearly to have Arctic issues discussed in the new Arctic Council where the Canadian 
government could promote “Canadian interests and values.”
   
247  As well, there was a particular 
concern to broaden the concept of human security to encompass environmental degradation.248
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4.4 September 11th and the Challenge of Terrorism 
After the release of the Northern Dimension document, very little occurred.  The Arctic 
question disappeared from the Chrétien government’s radar, overtaken by other issues that 
challenged the government in the latter part of its second electoral mandate.  Then on September 
11, 2001, the relationship between Canada and the US was transformed by the terrorist attacks 
on the US.  Following these attacks, the US Administration became more concerned with 
terrorists than with circumpolar cooperation. 249  Human security was overtaken by the new more 
traditional security agenda implicit in the Bush Doctrine; multilateral initiatives were no longer 
part of the thinking in Washington.250
In the weeks and months following the terrorist attacks, Canadian border security came 
under intense scrutiny as rumours abounded that the 9/11 terrorists entered the US from Canada.  
The myth originated in two Boston newspapers, the Globe and the Herald, and was propagated 
in the following days by stories in the Washington Post, the New York Post and the Christian 
Science Monitor.
  
251  Despite all of the Canadian government’s attempts to correct the falsehood, 
many in the US still believe that the terrorist attacks of September 11th were carried out by 
individuals who came into the US from Canada.  Evidently, US government officials perpetrated 
the myth.  In an interview with CBC in April 2009, Janet Napolitano, US Secretary of Homeland 
Security, stated that a number of terrorists have entered the US from Canada, including those 
who carried out the 9/11 attacks.252
Admittedly, such concerns were not completely unwarranted.  In 1999, Ahmed Ressan 
gained illegal entry to Canada and tried to cross into the US in a car laden with explosive 
materials.  The incident had caused much concern among US officials as to the security of the 
Canadian border.
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Canadians knew themselves that the country’s borders and coastlines needed more 
surveillance, particularly in the Arctic.  The military’s strength was dramatically undermined 
during the 1990s by a rash of budget cuts.  In the aftermath of September 11th, it become more 
and more apparent that Canada’s military was unable to perform even basic surveillance 
activities.254  This spelled trouble for future security in the Arctic.  At the Northern Research 
Forum in September 2004, the commander of Canadian Forces Northern Area stated that “(the 
Arctic) could become a soft target and a real challenge to the circumpolar security forces.”255
In response to security concerns, the US Administration announced the establishment of 
USNORTHCOM in April 2002, created specifically for “homeland defence,” and whose “area of 
operations” would include Canada.
 
256  Prime Minister Chrétien did not seem all that concerned 
about the implications of the US military creating a North American security perimeter of sorts: 
“the sovereignty of Canada cannot be taken away by this decision made by the administration of 
the United States...The defence of Canada will be assured by the Canadian government and not 
by the American government.”257  He seemed to believe that Canada’s sovereignty was well in 
hand.  The US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, tried to allay Canadians’ fears by stating 
that USNORTHCOM would neither patrol Canadian waters nor place US troops on Canadian 
soil.258
The sovereignty issue sparked by the creation of USNORTHCOM died fairly quickly.  
However, it highlighted the fact that the US believed that Canada could not properly secure its 
coastlines and borders, including the Arctic.  Rampant US fears of another terrorist attack, along 
with the pervasive belief that the 9/11 terrorists entered the US across the Canadian border, put 
Canada in a difficult position.  While Canadians understood the US’ need to secure itself and 
wanted to be “a responsible ally,”
 
259
 
 they also recognized that it was now particularly critical to 
remain firm on the question of northern sovereignty.  The progressively rapid melting of the 
Arctic sea ice did not help, as increased access to the Arctic only exacerbated US fears.   
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4.5 Paul Martin and a New Northern Strategy 
As time passed and the anxiety caused by the September 11th terrorist attacks gradually 
abated, the subject of the Arctic re-emerged on the radar of Canadians.  Increased public 
knowledge of climate change and its effects on the Arctic brought more attention to the region.  
By this time, Jean Chrétien had retired from office, and Paul Martin was Canada’s new Prime 
Minister.  Martin brought with him a renewed commitment to the Arctic.  In the Throne Speech 
of October 2004, following the Liberal election victory, the Martin government announced its 
intention to formulate a new “comprehensive” northern strategy, one which would seek to secure 
sovereignty in the North as well as increase the quality of life of all northerners through 
environmental protection and recommitment to social programs, all while building a strong 
economy and promoting circumpolar cooperation.260
 In December of 2004, Martin, along with Premiers Joseph Handley (NWT), Paul Okalik 
(Nunavut) and Dennis Fentie (Yukon), announced that together they would develop a “first-ever 
comprehensive strategy for the North.”
 
261  In late 2004, the Martin government sent a booklet to 
all northern Canadians entitled, Developing Your Northern Strategy.  It seems that Martin 
wanted to produce a document that was developed jointly by the federal and territorial 
governments; this was a marked difference from the Northern Dimension document which, while 
developed in consultation with northern Canadians, was published by the federal government.  In 
short, the proposed goals and objectives of the Martin government’s Arctic strategy were very 
similar to those of the Northern Dimension, such as strengthening circumpolar cooperation, 
protecting the environment, and ensuring sustainable economic development.  However, the 
Martin strategy also focused on renewing commitments to social programs (such as housing, 
health care, and education) and building infrastructure.262
In 2005, the Martin government released a commentary on Chrétien’s Northern 
Dimension policy.  It found that the overall objectives were still relevant, although in need of 
some updating.  However, it also found that the policy had not been successful in achieving its 
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specific policy goals, except for those pertaining to the Arctic Council.263  It recommended that 
new and more specific priorities be outlined for the next five years, including: continued 
strengthening of circumpolar leadership both within the Canadian government and in relation to 
other countries; more integration and cooperation with other federal agencies, departments and 
territorial governments; and continued engagement of Aboriginal peoples and northern 
Canadians in the policy-making process.264
 In terms of the Arctic, Martin never specifically mentioned relations with the US, but a 
willingness to work with the US Administration was implicit.  Within the ‘Diplomacy’ section of 
his government’s 2005 international policy statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the 
World, the objective of “devoting renewed attention to the Arctic” was included under the policy 
priority of “fostering the North American Partnership.”
 
265
This willingness to work with the US was reflected in Martin’s approach to security 
issues more broadly.  In the ‘Defence’ section of the 2005 International Policy Statement, the 
Martin government affirmed its desire to continue Canada’s close security relationship with the 
US, making a “renew[ed] commitment to continental defence, including through enhancing our 
domestic capabilities.”
  This, along with Martin’s expressed 
desire for a continued commitment to circumpolar cooperation through the Arctic Council, 
demonstrates that Martin wanted to carry forward the Chrétien practice of trying to work with 
the US on a multilateral level. 
266  To do so would be “clearly in our sovereign interest.”267  The 
International Policy Statement went on to state that because of the increased activity in the 
Arctic, “demands for sovereignty and security…[were continuing] to rise.”  Although these 
developments would “not result in the type of military threat to the North that we saw during the 
Cold War…they could have long-term security implications.”268
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the vast expanse of the Arctic posed a major threat to the security interests of both Canada and 
the US.   
 
4.6 Dealing with the US 
 The Chrétien and Martin years can be viewed as a success with respect to moving along 
the discussion between Canada and the US regarding the Arctic.  No major dispute erupted 
between the two countries over Arctic issues, and while there were differences of opinion 
regarding the composition and mandate of the Arctic Council and the need for greater security in 
the Arctic following September 11th, neither situation provoked the kind of nationalistic response 
in Canada caused by the Manhattan and Polar Sea incidents. 
 But what is striking about this period is the global order strategy adopted by both 
governments, in that they viewed solutions to the question of Arctic sovereignty as lying within a 
global system transformed by a rapidly evolving military, social and political global order.  For a 
moment, it looked like the creation of the Arctic Council might be the perfect example of this 
strategy.  The Council, as conceived by Canada, would have functioned as a security forum 
where less powerful circumpolar countries, such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
Canada, would be able to work in combination to press the US, as well as Russia, on Arctic 
issues.  Canada clearly took the lead in the venture to create such a Council.  However, by the 
time the negotiations with the US over the Council’s structure and functions had concluded, the 
Council was a much different kind of forum than the one envisaged by Canada. 
 Yet Canadians continued to reshape the global order in such a way that would give 
Canada the kind of support that it needed from the international community regarding the Arctic.  
By promoting the concept of human security, Canada played an important role in initiating a 
larger international dialogue about security.  It also gained widespread support and praise for a 
number of global human security initiatives, such as the ICC and the international treaty on 
landmines.  Canada’s prominence in these initiatives both gave the concept of human security 
international currency and allowed Canadians to further their own global interests.   
Canada used the concept of human security to try and reframe Arctic issues as matters of 
global and immediate concern.  As in the Manhattan episode, it once again sought to build an 
international coalition to counterbalance US power and influence.  While there is no clear 
evidence that the use of the human security concept resulted in a change in US policy, it is 
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difficult to dispute the influence that Canada gained on the Arctic Council as a result of its 
championing of the concept of human security.  
However, the Canadian government’s credibility with the US Administration was 
weakened in the wake of the September 11th attacks.  To the US, Canada’s inability to patrol its 
own coastlines made its northern neighbour a liability.  As an example of the general unease felt 
by Washington, a few days after the attacks the US Ambassador to Canada called for the creation 
of a North American security perimeter.269  Because of its perceived lax security measures, 
Canada had little choice but to seek to assuage US fears over border security, although it was 
Canadian officials who convinced the US Administration to adopt the Canadian draft of the 
Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan.270
As time passed and the events of September 11th gradually receded from everyone’s 
consciousness, issues that had gained prominence prior to 9/11 began to re-emerge in Canada-US 
relations.  One such issue was climate change.  Both Canada and the US realized that climate 
change was opening the Arctic to new opportunities, which would, over time, increase traffic in 
the area.  More traffic would make the area and its inhabitants increasingly susceptible to 
security threats and environmental damage.  The Martin government wanted to try and work 
with the US on border issues while pursuing its own Arctic agenda of sovereignty, circumpolar 
cooperation and environmental protection.  But his government was forced from office before its 
plans could be implemented.   
  This required the utilization of the strategies of ad 
hoc adjustment and deliberate integration. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 Both the Chrétien and Martin governments sought to deal with the US on Arctic issues by 
using the global order strategy.  In each instance, both were diverted from their paths and forced 
to manage Canada-US relations by other means.  For Chrétien, the negotiations surrounding the 
Arctic Council developed into bilateral bargaining – and the results were less than satisfactory.  
Chrétien was also forced to respond to the new US security agenda in the wake of the September 
11th attacks, in part because terrorism was viewed by Ottawa as a genuine threat to North 
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America, and also to soothe US fears.  In the later Chrétien years, this made it very difficult for 
the Canadian government to pursue its goal of multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.   
 Martin faced the challenge of bringing Canada-US relations in the Arctic back to where 
they were prior to the September 11th attacks.  While the international community remained 
fixated on security concerns, Martin attempted to push his Arctic agenda forward - which was 
partly the impetus for his successor’s Arctic agenda. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
STEPHEN HARPER AND RENEWED INTEREST IN THE ARCTIC 
 
5.1 The Changing Harper Policy 
The Arctic policy of the Conservative government, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, began to take shape during the 2006 Canadian election campaign.  In 
December 2005 it was revealed that a US nuclear submarine had travelled to the North Pole 
during the month of November; the submarine likely passed through Canadian waters on its 
journey.271
On December 23, 2005, Harper announced that if elected, his government would take “an 
aggressive approach to [Canadian] sovereignty,” and work to “persuade countries to respect that 
sovereignty and to obviously deal with us before they send vessels in our water.”  Harper 
claimed that his campaign promises would amount to far much more than just simply words; he 
argued that his strategy was one of action: “you don’t defend national sovereignty with flags, 
cheap election rhetoric and advertising campaigns…You need forces on the ground, ships in the 
sea, and proper surveillance.”
  There was no better opportunity for Harper to unveil his party’s Arctic strategy.   
272  Reiterating the words Professor Franklyn Griffiths used during 
the Polar Sea incident, Harper uttered what would become the infamous catchphrase for his 
Arctic policy: “sovereignty is something that you use…or you lose it.”273
Harper called for $3.5 billion to be spent on new infrastructure in the north, including 
three new icebreakers, an army training centre, and a deep-water port.  The money would also be 
used to fund new air patrols and unmanned drones to provide surveillance, as well as increase the 
number of Canadian Rangers operating in the Arctic.
     
274  The plans also included the creation of a 
new Arctic National Sensor System which would place “listening posts” at various points under 
the Arctic waters to track ships and submarines.  Harper also stated that he “would demand…that 
any foreign vessels travelling in Canadian territorial waters seek and get the consent of the 
federal government.”275
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On January 26, 2006, three days after the Conservatives were elected to power, Harper 
was forced to respond to US Ambassador David Wilkins’ comments regarding Canada’s 
sovereignty in the far North.  Wilkins had stated publicly that the US was not keen on the 
Conservatives’ plans to increase Canada’s presence in the Arctic and that the US still maintained 
that the Northwest Passage is in international strait, not Canadian internal waters.  Harper 
responded strongly: “The United States defends its sovereignty and the Canadian government 
will defend our sovereignty… It is the Canadian people we get our mandate from, not the 
ambassador of the United States."276
In June 2006, the new Harper government unveiled more particulars concerning its plans 
for the Arctic.  The Canada First Defence Strategy, released by the Department of Defence, 
defined the Canadian military’s six “core missions,” one of which was to “conduct daily 
domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD [North 
American Aerospace Defence Command].”
 
277  The Harper government cited the need for 
increased surveillance in the Arctic because of changing environmental conditions in the north - 
the decrease in the amount of ice in the Arctic allowed for increased transit throughout the 
region.  The overall intent of the First Defence Strategy was to rejuvenate the Canadian Forces; 
this would be done by increasing troop numbers and both expanding and updating the military’s 
equipment.  The $3.5 billion in funds for Arctic infrastructure announced during the election 
campaign was intended to “support” the First Defence Strategy.278
Prime Minister Harper made his first trip to the Arctic in August 2006, which included 
stops in all three northern territories.  In Iqaluit on August 12, he launched Operation Lancaster, 
a 12-day military exercise in the Arctic “designed to assert Canada’s sovereignty in the North.”
   
279
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The Prime Minister’s speech that day reiterated the government’s focus on protecting and 
entrenching Arctic sovereignty.  It also echoed his remarks from the campaign trail only months 
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before, stating that “you can’t defend Arctic sovereignty with words alone.”280  These sentiments 
were repeated time and again throughout the Prime Minister’s week-long Arctic visit.  However, 
for the first time Harper spoke of the need to protect the Arctic environment, announcing that the 
government would begin carrying out “pollution-detection surveillance flights” over Arctic 
waters.281
Yet after returning to Ottawa, Harper did little in the way of moving forward on Arctic 
issues.  On the contrary, in October 2006, he cut the position of Ambassador for Circumpolar 
Affairs, the role created in 1994 by the Chrétien government.  The government’s official reason 
for axing the position was “to save money.”
    
282  The federal budget delivered in March 2007 
contained no new Arctic commitments beyond the creation of a marine-protected area in the 
eastern Arctic.283
But Arctic issues did not disappear from the Harper government’s radar.  In July 2007, 
Harper once again used the “use it or lose it” reference in announcing the construction of up to 
eight new Polar Class 5 Arctic offshore patrol ships and a deep water port; building the ships was 
estimated to cost $3.1 billion.
   
284
The following month, August 2007, the Prime Minister once again headed to the Arctic.  
This time his destination was Resolute Bay, Nunavut, where he provided more details about his 
Arctic strategy from the 2006 election campaign.  The focus was on sovereignty once more as he 
announced that the aforementioned new army training base would be built in Resolute Bay; the 
promised deep-water port would be built in Nanisivik.  He also announced plans to increase the 
number of Canadian Rangers by 900 members.
  With this announcement, however, there was no promise of 
new money.   
285
The Speech from the Throne to open the second session of the 39th Canadian Parliament 
was read on October 16, 2007.  A significant part of the speech was specifically devoted to the 
Arctic and outlined the Harper government’s northern strategy: 
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“Our Government will bring forward an integrated northern strategy focused on 
strengthening Canada’s sovereignty, protecting our environmental heritage, promoting 
economic and northern development, and improving and devolving governance, so that 
northerners have greater control over their destinies.”286
Details of the strategy were unveiled in the 2008 federal budget, which defined the 
specifics of the Harper government’s “vision for a new North.”
 
287  The budget provided $34 
million over two years to aid in mapping Canada’s continental shelf in order to prepare its claim 
in compliance with UNCLOS; an extra $20 million was provided for the data collection and 
legal work behind this process.  But this announcement was only the tip of the iceberg, so to 
speak.  The big announcement in the budget was that the Harper government would set aside 
$720 million to build a new polar class icebreaker; Canada’s biggest icebreaker at the present, 
the CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent, is due to be decommissioned in 2017.288
 The summer of 2008 foreshadowed a major shift in US policy towards the Arctic.  US 
Coast Guard commander Admiral Thad Allen declared that the rapid reduction in sea traffic and 
a corresponding rise in ship traffic in the Arctic had caused the US to rethink its Arctic strategy: 
the US would be changing its focus in the region from scientific research to “sovereignty” and 
“security presence.”  Allen hinted that the US would announce a new Arctic strategy in the 
coming months.
   
289
Prime Minister Harper did, however, return to the Arctic a few weeks later for his third 
major trip to the region in as many years.  While there, and in the lead up to a national election 
campaign, he announced two major interrelated initiatives.  The first was the introduction of an 
amendment to the AWPPA, which expanded Canada’s economic zone from 100 to 200 miles.  
Bill C-3 would die on the order paper when Parliament was prorogued in December 2008, but a 
similar bill would be passed by the subsequent Parliament and receive royal assent in June 
2009.
  There was no response in Ottawa to Allen’s comments. 
290
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Shipping Act to “require mandatory reporting from all ships destined for Arctic waters within the 
same 200 nautical mile limit” defined by the amendment to the AWPPA.291  The purpose of 
these initiatives was to both protect the Arctic environment and increase security in the area.292  
US reaction to Harper’s announcement was cautious.  The US Embassy stated that it would 
“want to ensure that any enhanced protection of the Canadian Arctic marine environment is 
achieved in a manner that is consistent with the international law of the sea.”293
 Approximately a week and a half after his visit to the Arctic, Harper asked Governor 
General Michaëlle Jean to dissolve Parliament and call a national election.  The Arctic question 
was not a major election issue, as it had been in the 2006 national election campaign.  However, 
Harper was forced to respond to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s proposal to legislate in 
support of Russia’s Arctic claims.
   
294  While campaigning in Iqaluit, Harper expressed concern 
that Russia’s actions might “indicate some desire to work outside of the international 
framework…And that’s obviously why we’re taking a range of measures including military 
measures to strengthen our sovereignty in the North.”295  Conservative campaign advisers 
acknowledged that the campaign stop was a “strategic” one, meant to reaffirm the Harper 
government’s commitment to Arctic issues and Canadian Arctic sovereignty.296
Nothing further was heard from the Harper government regarding Arctic policy until 
early January 2009.  Just over a week before the end of his presidency, George W. Bush released 
a national security directive which spelled out a new direction in US Arctic policy.  The 
document, referenced as NSPD-66, was the first Arctic policy strategy announcement since the 
Clinton administration released a PDD on the Arctic in February 1994.  The document was 
written to “reflect the creation of new federal agencies such as the Department of Homeland 
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Security and because the changing climate in northern latitudes [had] spurred new military and 
commercial activity there.”297
The Bush directive reflected some of the themes of the Clinton directive, such as 
pursuing cooperation with other Arctic nations and a willingness to both manage environmental 
threats and find solutions.  However, the Bush directive differed in its tone.  For example, it 
referred to the threat of terrorism in the Arctic and the need for the US to protect itself.
 
298  What 
was shocking for Canada was the aggressiveness of the directive on two particular issues.  First, 
it explicitly rejected Canada’s sovereignty claim over the Northwest Passage by stating it is “a 
strait used for international navigation.”  Second, it drew attention to the unresolved boundary 
dispute between Canada and the US in the Beaufort Sea.299
Reaction in Canada was swift as Ottawa condemned the Bush policy.  Some saw it as a 
direct affront to Harper’s Arctic agenda.
 
300  Others used the opportunity to push the Harper 
government to spend more money in order to solidify Canadian control over the Arctic region.  
NWT Premier Floyd Roland stated: “Canada can no longer afford to maintain a passive approach 
to our Northern interests.  Empty rhetoric will not secure our sovereignty...The words have been 
kind to us, the highlight of the north has been good, but now we need to back it up with 
action.”301
Harper responded by saying that he had always been “very clear with President Bush” 
regarding his government’s determination to “assert sovereignty over all of [Canada’s] land and 
sea territories.”  However, he wished to work with the US to resolve disputes rather than risk a 
repeat of the Manhattan and Polar Sea incidents.
 
302
                                                 
297 Juliet Eilperin and Spencer S. Hsu, “White House Directive Guides Policy in Arctic,” Washington Post, 19 
January 2009. Available online: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/18/ 
  Later that week, Foreign Affairs Minister 
Lawrence Cannon, while stating there was nothing “particularly provocative” in Bush’s Arctic 
directive, criticized Bush’s “view that security issues or a potential future terrorist threat from the 
AR2009011802085.html> (12 September 2009). 
298 George W. Bush, “Directive on Arctic Region Policy,” NSPD-66, Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents 45, no. 2 (19 January 2009): 48. Available online: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2009_presidential_documents&docid=pd19ja09_txt-11.pdf> (12 June 2010). 
299 Ibid., 48-49, 50. 
300 Mike Blanchfield and Randy Boswell, “Bush muscles in on Arctic; Cites threat of terror, orders aggressive stance 
in North,” Edmonton Journal, 13 January 2009, p. A1. [Online Database Subscription]: Canadian Newsstand [4 
August 2009]. 
301 Mike Blanchfield and Randy Boswell, “Robust response urged on Arctic assertions; US considers using its 
powerful navy to claim resource-rich Arctic territory,” The Vancouver Sun, 14 January 2009, p. B2. [Online 
Database Subscription]: Canadian Newsstand [4 August 2009]. 
302 Ibid. 
 57 
north were key concerns.”303
The Harper government continued with its protectionist strategy regarding the Arctic.  
The 2009 federal budget was unveiled on January 27, which included the announcement of the 
construction of a “world-class, High Arctic research station.”  INAC was given $2 million to 
carry out a feasibility study, as well as an additional $85 million to maintain and upgrade 
existing Arctic research facilities.
  The furor over the Bush directive died down quickly as Bush’s 
presidency ended and Barack Obama became the 44th US President. 
304
In August 2009, Harper again travelled to the Arctic.  He observed Operation Nanook 
2009, a military operational exercise whose purpose is to demonstrate Canadian sovereignty in 
the Arctic, and he announced the establishment of a new economic agency, along with plans for 
the construction of a new small craft harbour in Pangnirtung, Nunavut.
   
305  Harper’s annual treks 
to the Arctic had been largely regarded as attempts to “try to send a message” to the US, and 
Russia, that Canada was serious about maintaining its presence in the region.306  Yet his 
government’s commitment to the region was questioned when the Ottawa Citizen cited industry 
officials as stating that its $3 billion-dollar program to build Arctic patrol vessels was on hold.  
The Department of Defence countered, stating that this was not the case, and that it was simply 
still working on the design of the ships.307
That same month saw a US incursion on northern territory that Canada considered its 
own.  The US Secretary of Commerce introduced an Arctic Fishery Management Plan, which 
prohibited commercial fishing in the Beaufort Sea within an area disputed between Canada and 
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the US.308  In response, Canada filed a formal diplomatic protest.309  A few months later, the 
State of Alaska announced an auction of oil and gas leases for areas which included the disputed 
zone in the Beaufort Sea.310
It was at the end of July 2009 that a marked change was observable in the Harper strategy 
towards the US on the Arctic.  At this time, the Harper government released its long-awaited 
northern strategy document, entitled Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our 
Future.  The substance and tone of the document suggested a turn to a more problem-solving, 
and also multilateral, approach.  The 40-page booklet contained a compilation of the various 
announcements and promises made by the Harper government during the past two and a half 
years.  It then outlined how the government intended to approach Canada-US relations in the 
Arctic in the future.  Calling the US “an exceptionally valuable partner in the Arctic,” the 
document acknowledged Canada’s commitment to “effective collaboration and cooperation with 
the United States,” and expressed its desire to “continue to deepen cooperation on emerging 
Arctic issues, bilaterally and through the Arctic Council and other multilateral institutions.”
   
311
Shortly after this, the Harper government gained support for its strategy of cooperation 
from an unlikely place.  In November 2009, the US Navy issued an “Arctic roadmap,” a five-
year strategic plan to expand its operations in the North.
 
312  The “roadmap” was based on the 
idea that the Arctic Ocean would be open water by 2030.313  Its main goals were to “ensure naval 
readiness and capability and promote maritime security in the Arctic region,”314
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stakeholders.”315  The plan also called for active lobbying by the US Navy to get the US 
Administration to sign the UNCLOS agreement.316
In February 2010, Canada and the US agreed to make a serious effort to resolve the 
decades-long sovereignty dispute over the Beaufort Sea by holding bilateral talks on the issue.
  
317  
Canada took the initiative, inviting the US to engage in a discussion of the issues after analyzing 
scientific data gathered in a joint Canada-US venture to map the seabed floor of the Beaufort Sea 
in order to determine the extent of each country’s continental shelf.  The data showed a possible 
overlap of the continental shelves of Canada and the US.  A DFAIT spokesperson commented 
that because of this new data, it “may make sense to resolve the maritime boundary and any 
extended continental shelf overlaps at the same time.”318  The two sides met again in March, 
where they came to an understanding that both countries would benefit from the others’ 
interpretation of the boundary, setting up the possibility of a negotiated settlement. 319  The same 
DFAIT spokesperson stated that resolving the long-standing dispute was now a priority for the 
Harper government.320
At the same time, Harper decided to hold a meeting of the finance ministers of the G7 
countries in Iqaluit.  Finance Minister Jim Flaherty admitted that the choice of venue was based 
on “one of [the Harper] government’s priorities, the assertion of [Canadian] sovereignty in the 
Arctic.”
   
321  Then in March, the Harper government announced that possibly as soon as July 1, 
2010, the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations would be implemented, 
requiring certain ships to report to authorities when entering, while moving within, and exiting 
northern Canadian waters.322
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  This mandatory system of reporting would replace the voluntary 
NORDREG system that currently exists.  Vessels would be required to report such information 
as identity and planned route, and the regulations would apply to both Canadian and foreign 
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ships.323  According to the Harper government, the rationale for the regulations lay in the need 
“to promote safe and efficient navigation” and provide “environmental protection.”324
In March 2010, the Speech from the Throne confirmed the Harper government’s interest 
in dealing with Arctic issues in a multilateral or global context.  While reiterating that the 
government would “continue to vigorously defend Canada’s Arctic sovereignty,” 
 
325 it also 
confirmed the government’s newfound willingness to work towards negotiated settlements on 
seabed claims and other disputes.  The Harper government would “work with other northern 
countries to settle boundary disagreements.”326  The 2010 federal budget, which followed, 
reaffirmed the Harper government’s commitment to the building of a High Arctic Research 
Station.  The budget provided $18 million over five years to INAC to begin the design phase of 
the project.327
By this time, the new Obama Administration was itself starting to take a more global 
position on Arctic issues.  In fact, the view emanating from Washington was that Canada’s 
perspective on Arctic questions was not sufficiently expansive.  In late March 2010, Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton criticized Canada for holding a summit of the five Arctic coastal states that 
excluded a number of parties with “legitimate interests” in the Arctic; the parties excluded 
included Sweden, Finland, and Iceland, as well as indigenous peoples.
   
328  Responding to charges 
that the limited invitation list reflected a lack of respect for the Arctic Council, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Lawrence Cannon stated that the meeting had been held to discuss issues specifically 
pertaining to Arctic coastal states.329  He added that Canada certainly respected the mandate of 
the Arctic Council, especially since it helped establish it.330
Shortly after this, Cannon made his own trip to two northern Canadian communities.  The 
intent was to affirm Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic, but to also check on and bring 
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attention to the scientific work being done in advance of Canada’s submission to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.331  Coupled with this was the long-awaited 
announcement by the Harper government of a National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, 
which was assumed to include the completion of plans to build new Arctic patrol vessels and a 
polar icebreaker.332
 
 
5.2 Dealing with the US 
The Harper government’s initial approach to dealing with the US on the Arctic was one 
of building defences to strengthen Canada’s sovereignty claims.  This approach not only entailed 
the construction of new ships and harbours, but also involved the deployment of ‘Canada versus 
the US’ rhetoric by the government, resulting in the rekindling of Canadian Arctic nationalism.  
From the start, the Harper government sold itself as the guardian of the north.   
 But by July 2009 the Harper government’s strategy had shifted, from one of defending 
and asserting Canadian sovereignty by building defences to one of ad hoc adjustment.  The 
change was particularly evident in the Northern Strategy document, where the US was no longer 
seen as an Arctic rival but as an “exceptionally valuable partner” with whom Canada would seek 
to “deepen cooperation.”333
But the more striking change in Harper’s strategy for dealing with the US on Arctic 
issues, seeing as previous governments had utilized the ad hoc adjustment strategy from time to 
time on Arctic questions, was Harper’s acceptance of the global order strategy, and that 
solutions to certain Arctic issues for Canada lay in the multilateral/global arena.  This can be 
seen in the Northern Strategy document, as well as in the decision to host a meeting of Arctic 
  It was also seen in the opening of discussions with the US regarding 
the Beaufort Sea boundary dispute.  The one difference between Harper’s approach to 
cooperating with the US and the cooperative approach pursued by the Mulroney government was 
that Harper shied away from any form of integration of decision-making processes between 
Canada and the US on Arctic matters.  The outcome of the negotiations over the Beaufort Sea 
boundary dispute will determine whether this remains the case.   
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coastal states in March 2010.  The reasons for this change are not clear, but likely had something 
to do with the arrival of the Obama Administration.  The election of President Barack Obama 
was largely viewed by Canadians as a positive change for Canada-US relations, as most believed 
Obama would move US foreign policy from unilateralism towards multilateralism.334
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CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION - SAME PROBLEM, WHICH SOLUTION? 
 
6.1 The Relevance of Kirton’s Strategies in Dealing with the US 
The nature of the Canada-US dispute in the Arctic has not changed over the past number 
of decades.  The two countries continue to disagree on three territorial disputes: the status of the 
Northwest Passage, where the Beaufort Sea boundary lies, and who owns what part of the Arctic 
Ocean.  While over the years governments have changed, and now climate change threatens to 
transform the Arctic in terms of both geography and function, the question remains the same: 
how does Canada deal with US refusal to recognize Canadian sovereignty over the waters of the 
Arctic archipelago? 
 Canada has used most of the strategies identified by Kirton as a means of dealing with the 
US on Arctic issues.  The strategy of ad hoc adjustment was used by the Mulroney government 
when it set out to negotiate an end to the Canada-US dispute over the Northwest Passage.  It tried 
to find a practical solution to the problem, one that would satisfy both sides.  This same approach 
appears to be the strategy of choice for the Harper government in resolving the Beaufort Sea 
boundary dispute. 
 The Mulroney government also utilized the deliberate integration strategy, which 
involves both cooperating and integrating with the US.  It employed this approach in the ACA 
negotiations, as it tried to allay US security concerns.  Security was also the main reason why the 
Chrétien and Martin governments chose to both integrate and cooperate with the US in the wake 
of the September 11th attacks.  Canada collaborated with the US on a number of security 
measures since it and the US had mutual concerns regarding control of the Arctic waters.   
 The third strategy, building defences to counteract US power and influence, was the 
initial approach of both the Mulroney and Harper governments.  Mulroney drew straight 
baselines around the Arctic archipelago and announced that his government would increase 
surveillance over the region.  In the 1987 White Paper the Mulroney government promised to 
build up to a dozen nuclear submarines.  The same types of announcements have been made by 
the Harper government.  Promises to build new icebreakers, new harbours, new ships and new 
military training centers, all while increasing the presence of the Canadian military in the region, 
parallel the promises made by the Mulroney government.  Each government designed its strategy 
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as a means of bolstering Canada’s presence in the Arctic, and therefore asserting Canadian 
control over it.   
 The truth is that this strategy is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, regardless of 
how much money Canada spends to establish its military presence, the US will always have 
more ships, more troops and more resources.  Second, Canada can only insulate itself so much in 
the face of constant pressure to cooperate and integrate, particularly in the areas of economics 
and security.  Third, and perhaps most important, the Canadian public has simply not been 
prepared to make a long-term commitment to military spending in the Arctic.  Governments have 
taken their cue and reneged on their several spending commitments.   
 The fourth strategy of political penetration is one that has not been used much by any 
government.  This option is very labour-intensive, requiring Canada to infiltrate the US domestic 
policy process, find US lobby groups, politicians and government players who agree with the 
Canadian position, and then have them pressure the US Administration.  The outcomes of this 
strategy are very uncertain; there is no means of knowing whether the resources placed into such 
a strategy will reap the desired results.  Furthermore, the US policy process is large and complex, 
making it difficult for Canadian officials to gain a foothold within it.  In the case of the Arctic, 
the difficulty of this strategy is compounded by US refusal to acknowledge Canadian sovereignty 
of the Northwest Passage for fear of setting a precedent that would lead other coastal states to 
declare their own waters as internal, thus jeopardizing the mobility of the US Navy.335  While 
there is sympathy for the Canadian legal position on the Northwest Passage within the US 
government, as shown by US President Ronald Reagan in his discussions with Canadian Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney, the US determination to protect freedom of navigation may be too 
large an obstacle to overcome.336
 
    
6.2 A Common Thread 
  This thesis has highlighted the global order strategy – whereby Canada seeks to reshape 
the global order in the pursuit of Canadian values and interests – as a strategy of choice for 
Canadian governments in dealing with the US on Arctic questions.  This approach was used 
extensively by the Trudeau, Chrétien and Martin governments.  Trudeau centered his entire 
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response to the Manhattan incident on this approach.  He used growing global environmental 
concern to create support for measures to institute controls over the waters of the Northwest 
Passage.  By placing itself at the center of the dialogue on environmental issues, Canada was 
able to build a coalition of nations whose communal power offset that of the US and helped to 
generate support for its environmental and international legal interests.   
Similarly, Chrétien and Martin worked to further Canadian interests, initially by working 
with others within the Arctic Council and later, by gathering international support for the concept 
of human security.  In the case of human security, the efforts of both governments were thwarted 
by the terrorist attacks of September 11th and by a renewed focus on traditional security.  
However, they were successful in using the newly-established Arctic Council to place Canada in 
a position of international influence on Arctic issues, even though the Arctic Council became 
more of a forum than a decision-making body. 
The Mulroney government only moved towards the global order strategy at the end of its 
mandate.  The end of the Cold War provided it with an opportunity to take steps to situate Arctic 
issues in the multilateral arena.  While Mulroney did not see his idea of an Arctic Council come 
to fruition, he should be credited with creating another opportunity for Canada to pursue its own 
interests and provide leadership on Arctic issues. 
Like the Mulroney government, the Harper government leaned towards the global order 
strategy after it had utilized, and only achieved moderate success with, other bilateral strategies.  
Its approach is particularly striking considering the unusually strong nationalistic rhetoric that 
Harper employed at the beginning of his government’s mandate – although not surprising given 
his limited success in efforts at bilateral negotiation with the US. 
 
6.3 Why the Consistency? 
Why has the global order strategy been a strategy of choice for governments in Canada 
in dealing with the US on Arctic issues?  One obvious factor is Canada’s historical inclination to 
work for change in the international system by using its influence in multilateral organizations.  
Multilateralism has been a fact of international life for Canada stretching back to Canada’s post-
war involvement in the formation of the UN, NATO, and a multiracial Commonwealth, and has 
always been a way of countering or balancing the power of Canada’s continental neighbour, the 
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US superpower.337  It allows Canada to pursue its own interests and protect itself from 
domination by others.338
There also appears to be a number of systemic and domestic factors that have pushed 
governments in Canada towards a global Arctic strategy.   The ever-changing international 
agenda and the corresponding evolution of the international system constitute a major factor.  
The emergence of environmental issues in the late 1960s created new challenges for Canada in 
the Arctic that it could only meet effectively by working within the global system.  And both the 
end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001 forced Canada to look at security 
challenges in the Arctic in an unprecedented global way.   
  The global order strategy is essentially multilateralism ‘plus.’  The 
focus is on reshaping the international agenda, through multilateral engagement, for the purposes 
of furthering Canadian interests.  Multilateralism is essentially a means to greater ends.  
The continuing evolution of international maritime law is another major systemic factor 
affecting Canada’s strategic approach to the Arctic.  The US has not signed the UNCLOS 
agreement.  Canada’s legal position regarding the Northwest Passage is not unassailable.  
Canada and the US continue to disagree over their mutual boundary in the Beaufort Sea.  No one 
is sure who owns what part of the continental shelf under the Arctic Ocean.  All of this 
uncertainty requires that Canada continue to publicly affirm its position on Arctic sovereignty, 
while looking for opportunities to work with others to move the international agenda forward in 
a global context.  In both ways, Canada effectively pursues its own interests. 
The primary domestic factor affecting the utilization of the global order strategy is 
abiding Canadian nationalism.  Canadians have a strong nationalistic attachment to the Arctic, 
and there is a protectionist instinct, coupled with an aversion to US power and influence, that 
propels the Canadian government to find ways to satisfy the public when issues of Arctic 
sovereignty arise.  This strategy may not resonate as strongly with passionate Canadian 
nationalists at home, but it does go some distance in meeting the public’s desire that Canada be 
active in the international realm in furthering Canada’s interests. 
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6.4 Future Directions 
There have been many calls for Canada to negotiate an end to Arctic disputes with the US 
by engaging in bilateral talks.  Many would like to see the Arctic issue settled once and for all, 
and calls to negotiate are nothing new.  The Mulroney government tried this approach with the 
ACA, but failed to find a long-lasting and beneficial solution.  Yet there are an increasing 
number of experts and writers pushing for a negotiated end to the problem.339
A leading advocate of a bilateral solution is Professor Franklyn Griffiths, who recently 
asserted that in a post-9/11 world, “the United States no longer gains from a position that treats 
the passage as an international strait and thereby gives ready entry to foreign vessels, which may 
be carrying terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and the like into northernmost North America 
for transfer southward.”
 
340  Griffiths argues that the US has already given its “tacit approval” for 
Canada to control the Northwest Passage by not denouncing the Harper government’s plans to 
build up infrastructure and increase surveillance in the Arctic.341  Therefore, Canada “should 
forget about trying to convince the U.S. to concede Canadian control of the passage and instead 
pursue a policy of conflict-avoidance and partnership-building.”342  According to Griffiths, the 
ACA should be used as a “framework” for future negotiations and subsequent agreements.343
Another proposition, forwarded by Andrea Charron, is that Canada should forget about 
trying to get the US to recognize Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic and “be creative and think 
beyond just the voyage to the possibility of an international, open, Canadian passage.”
 
344
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Indeed, as the Arctic continues to become increasingly accessible to more people, more 
scholarship is needed which explores different modes of bilateral and international cooperation, 
diverse policy approaches, and Canada’s role as an Arctic power.  It is in Canada’s interests to 
put itself in the best possible position for the future, as it is only beginning to realize the value 
and potential of its vast Arctic. 
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